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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Analysis of Pricing and Reserving Risks with Applications in Risk-Based Capital 
Regulation for Property/Casualty Insurance Companies 
 
BY 
 
Chayanin Kerdpholngarm 
 
December 7th, 2007 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Shaun Wang 
 
Major Academic Unit: Risk Management and Insurance 
 
 
The subject of the study for this dissertation is the relationship between pricing 
and reserving risks for property-casualty insurance companies. Since the risk 
characteristics of insurers differ based on their structure, objectives and incentives, 
segmenting the insurers into subgroups would allow for a better understanding of 
group-specific risks. Based on this approach to analyzing insurer financial risks, we 
find that, in a given accident year, the pricing and reserving errors are positively 
correlated, especially in long-tailed lines of business. Large insurers, stock insurers, 
and multi-state insurers, in general, exhibit a strong correlation between accident-year 
price and reserve errors. However, only size of insurers appears to be a factor that 
influences the interaction between price changes and the calendar year loss reserve 
adjustments. Furthermore, we find that the pricing risk and reserving risk are 
marginally more homogenous within a market segment when size, type and number 
of states are employed as criteria for market segmentation, hence insurance regulators 
should consider the refined market segments for the RBC formula. The empirical 
results also indicate that, in general, Chain-Ladder reserving method likely contributes 
to loss reserve errors when there is a change in the loss development pattern and the 
magnitude of the errors is worse for large insurers. Finally, we find that our proposed 
measurement method for the product diversification benefit provides support for the 
notion that the diversification benefit on the incurred losses increases with the number 
of lines in the portfolio. Yet, the diminishing returns tend to decrease the 
diversification benefit on the incurred losses for insurers that write the business in 
more than six of the selected lines. To the contrary, our proposed measure does not 
provide clear evidence that writing business in many product lines increases the 
product diversification benefit with respect to adverse loss development. We do find 
that the diversification benefit for both incurred losses and loss development is higher 
for larger insurers. Hence, for risk management and regulatory purposes, a stronger 
case can be made for considering firm size than product diversification. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
The subject of the study for this dissertation is the relationship between pricing 
and reserving risks for property-casualty insurance companies. As will be explained, 
estimates of historical losses are an important input in the pricing of many property-
casualty insurance lines. In long-tail lines, initial estimates of unpaid losses (i.e., loss 
reserves) are particularly subject to error and subsequent revision as reported claims 
are paid or adjusted, additional claims (arising from policies issued in prior years) are 
reported, and new information pertinent to reserve estimates becomes available. The 
risk associated with reserve errors would be expected to be closely linked with the 
risk associated with pricing errors depending on the line of insurance and insurer 
characteristics. Further, the link between reserve and pricing errors has important 
implications for firm risk management and regulation. This dissertation hypothesizes 
and tests this relationship empirically using alternative models and methods and 
examines the consequences of its findings for firm and market behavior, insurer 
financial risk management and insurance regulation.  
Reserve and pricing errors appear to be tied to the phenomenon know as the 
“underwriting cycle.” It is well-known that the property-casualty insurance industry, 
especially for long-tailed lines of business, experiences alternating periods of “soft 
markets” and “hard markets”. In soft markets, supply expands and prices fall as 
insurers seek to increase the business they write (and/or retain the business they have 
written) in the face of falling market prices. Empirical data suggest that prices fall 
below costs in soft markets, resulting in low or negative profits for insurance firms. In 
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hard markets, supply contracts and insurers raise their prices to levels that at least 
achieve profits or rates of return equal to the cost of capital. Hence, the risk of under-
pricing appears to vary across different phases of the underwriting cycle. This is one 
of several aspects of the reserve-pricing error relationship examined in this 
dissertation. 
Based on theory and empirical evidence, we argue that the risk of 
underestimating reserves for unpaid losses is associated with the risk of under-pricing. 
Under-estimation of loss reserves will cause total losses incurred by insurers to be 
underestimated and profits and surplus to be overstated. These errors can have further 
implications for insurers’ financial and market decisions. Importantly, insurers’ 
estimates of their historical losses play a significant role in their calculation of the 
prices they should charge in the future. Hence, underestimation of unpaid losses 
attributable to prior periods can lead to under-pricing of insurance contracts in future 
periods. 
Most of the academic research on the underwriting cycle has sought to find 
“rational” economic explanations for the phenomenon, e.g., changes in interest rates, 
loss shocks, data reporting lags, etc. (see, for example, Doherty and Garven, 1992). 1  
However, these studies tend to focus on drivers of pricing risk while ignoring the 
interaction between pricing and reserving risks. As estimates of historical losses are a 
major input in the calculation of insurers’ prices for future periods, it is reasonable to 
surmise that reserving errors are correlated with pricing errors. Lack of knowledge 
about the interaction between these risks hampers an insurer in making appropriate 
decisions and consequently could aggravate the overall risk of the firm. Developing a 
better understanding of the interaction among these firm risks contributes to a better 
                                                 
1 Klein (2004) provides a summary review of theoretical and empirical research on the underwriting 
cycle. 
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understanding of firm risk management as well as the dynamics of the underwriting 
cycle. 
Additionally, the link between pricing and reserving errors has implications 
for the financial regulation of insurers. In theory, regulators monitor and seek to limit 
insurers’ financial risk (i.e., the risk of default or financial impairment). Regulators 
seek to accomplish this objective through various means, including financial reporting 
requirements, measurement and analysis of insurers’ financial performance, condition 
and risk, capital standards, and intervention with insurers that are in financial distress. 
All of these activities are affected by reserve errors and their consequences for pricing 
errors. 
Recently, the insurance industry has recognized that a behavioral approach is 
an important key to effective risk assessment and risk management. Consequently, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and rating agencies have 
been incorporating an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) initiative into their Risk-
Based Capital (RBC) requirements. ERM also is an important component of the 
Solvency II regulatory standards being developed for insurance companies in the EU. 
The ERM, in one respect, can be thought of as the interaction among various forces 
and market participants. Wang and Faber (2006) defined enterprise risk management 
as “the discipline of studying the risk dynamics of the enterprise … and how players’ 
actions influence the behaviors of the risk dynamics…” This definition supports the 
notion that the behavior of insurance participants is important to risk evaluation.  
The recognition of such a behavioral impact on enterprise risk can help 
provide a baseline for examining the underwriting cycle phenomenon. Insurers may 
respond differently to the market environments that vary across the cycle. During soft 
markets, price competition is intense and underwriters strive to increase the amount of 
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business and premiums they write. In so doing they reduce prices and relax their 
underwriting standards to acquire more business. However, this can result in 
inadequate premiums relative to the actual costs that insurers should expect to incur, 
resulting in causing high loss ratios when actual costs become apparent. Contrary to 
what happens in the soft markets, price competition lessens during hard markets. 
Insurers increase prices and underwriting rules are tightened. Losses (i.e., low or 
negative profits) from inadequate prices during soft markets are followed by relatively 
high profits earned in hard markets. 
Another interesting market process that tends to correspond to the 
underwriting cycle is the so-called “reserving cycle” phenomenon. The reserving 
cycle refers to the cyclical pattern of understatement and overstatement of loss 
reserves by insurers. It arises from inaccurate estimations of loss reserves, whether 
deliberately or not, by insurers. Based on a review of industry aggregate data, the 
reserving cycle appears to track the underwriting cycle.  
Among academic researchers, there are different opinions about the causes of 
reserve errors and their link to pricing errors. Many researchers may believe that 
reserve errors (and price errors) are inadvertent and unintentional (e.g., Wang and 
Faber, 2006).2 Some researchers, however, suggest that reserves may be intentionally 
manipulated to change reported financial results and also support certain business 
decisions, such as setting prices (e.g., Gaver & Paterson, 1999), tax planning, and 
smoothing of performance. For example, according to this view, insurers may 
intentionally set lower reserves to justify lower prices and set higher reserves to 
justify higher prices. However, a relationship between reserving errors and pricing 
                                                 
2 While many researchers have sought to develop rational economic explanations for insurers’ reserve 
and price calculations and the underwriting cycle, it is apparent that insurance practitioners believe that 
there is a significant behavioral component to these phenomena. A review of insurance trade press 
articles yields numerous practitioner assessments that conclude that insurers are deliberately under-
pricing and failing to enforce stringent underwriting standards during soft markets.  
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errors does not depend on insurers’ intent – one would expect to observe such a 
relationship regardless of whether there is deliberate manipulation or not. 
Not only do reserving and pricing (underwriting) risks vary over time, they 
also likely differ across types of insurers. For instance, publicly traded stock 
companies that face pressure to increase earnings, either from shareholders or from 
managers who are compensated based on profits, would be expected to act differently 
than mutual companies. Stock insurers have an incentive to manipulate their reported 
financial results in order to please their shareholders (Grace and Leverty, 2005). One 
way of achieving this is to manage loss reserves to smooth earnings.  However, 
adverse effects from these manipulations, once recognized, can potentially cause 
trouble for insurers – they may be ultimately compelled to report “adverse” loss 
development and lower their reported earnings.3 
In theory, government regulation should prevent insurers from misstating their 
financial condition and incurring excessive financial risk. The current RBC formula in 
the US, however, does not consider the relationship between reserving and pricing 
errors and how these risks may vary over time and among insurers. The same 
regulatory requirements and measures are applied to all insurers regardless of their 
organizational form and market conditions. In addition, the NAIC RBC formula does 
not recognize the interaction between pricing risk and reserving risk. Indeed, it 
assumes the two risks are independent. These limitations of the RBC formula can 
distort the calculation of insurers’ capital requirements and potentially influence their 
financial risk management. 
                                                 
3 Considerable time may pass before insurers are compelled to increase their loss reserves for prior 
years and suffer the consequences of historical under-reserving. Increases in an insurer’s loss reserves 
for prior years are reflected in the calendar-year financial results when the reserves are adjusted. 
Schedule P in insurers’ regulatory financial statements shows their premiums and losses on a calendar-
accident year basis, i.e., losses are reported for the year in which they are incurred. 
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Insurance regulators in other jurisdictions have started to recognize the 
significance of individual insurer risk characteristics and are attempting to incorporate 
them into their capital formula. During the course of the development of the Solvency 
II Directive in the European Union (EU), an important issue has been raised regarding 
the capital requirements that will be imposed on small and medium-sized insurers. 
According to the Solvency II proposals, small companies may be subject to 
multiplicative size-factors that increase the amount of required capital required for 
pricing risk and reserving risk. However, this approach is unfavorable to small niche 
companies that seem to have more stable results.4 
The underwriting cycle’s impact is also reflected in the currently proposed 
Solvency II capital requirement. The expected profits or losses from business written 
in the following statement date are treated as an allowance in the capital standards.5  
However, the expected profit allowance is simply the average of profitability in the 
previous three-to-five-year period. At the turn of the market cycle, this method can 
produce a reduction in capital requirements in softening markets and an increase in 
capital requirements in hardening markets. However, this treatment of the 
underwriting cycle is inappropriate for the cycle’s turning periods.    
Taken together, this discussion indicates that the topic of this dissertation is 
interesting and important for several reasons. First, it deals with important elements of 
decision-making in insurance firms. Second, it has significant implications for the 
assessment and management of insurers’ financial risk. Third, it is very relevant to the 
financial regulation of insurance companies, including but not limited to regulatory 
                                                 
4 In the initial development of the NAIC’s RBC formula, a component that would increase RBC 
charges for small companies was eliminated because of concerns about strong opposition from small 
insurers as well its failure to distinguish among small insurers according to the stability of their 
earnings. 
5 See Klein and Wang (2007) for an overview of Solvency II proposals and the process for their 
adoption and implementation. 
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capital requirements. Finally, it offers potential insights into factors affecting 
insurance market conditions and the underwriting cycle – a phenomenon that 
continues to intrigue researchers and plague market participants. 
1.2. Contribution 
This dissertation focuses on the interaction between pricing and reserving 
risks, and proposes a practical approach to refine the RBC formula for property-
casualty insurers that reflects this interaction. We suggest that refined segment 
classification based on the risk characteristics of insurers is the key to an appropriate 
capital requirement. Since the risk characteristics of insurers differ based on their 
structure, objectives and incentives, segmenting the insurers into subgroups would 
allow for a better understanding of group-specific risks and support more refined risk 
management strategies and regulatory capital requirements. Based on this approach to 
analyzing insurer financial risks, we focus on four important questions.  
The first question is whether the reserving risks of insurers change with 
varying market conditions during the underwriting cycle. Fitzpatrick (2004) provides 
an explanation of a behavioral theory of the underwriting cycle in which he opines 
that the underwriting cycle is specific to each insurer and market sector. The insurers 
who cut prices to expand their business dominate the market pricing action except 
when past pricing problems (i.e., inadequate prices) are recognized. In this study, we 
characterize structures, objectives and incentives in terms of their size, type, specialist 
expertise, and “locality”.  
The NAIC RBC formula applies a covariance adjustment which is equal to the 
square root of the sum of squares of each risk category.6 The risks, including pricing 
                                                 
6 See section 3.2. for more details. 
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and reserving risks that are subject to square root adjustment, are assumed to be 
substantially uncorrelated. However, we observed that pricing and reserving risks are 
highly correlated. The lack of a proper correlation adjustment in the RBC formula 
combined with the fact that pricing and reserving risks comprise 80 percent of the 
aggregate industry RBC raises serious questions about the calculation of insurers 
RBC requirements.7 Changes in the RBC formula that would consider the interaction 
of reserving and pricing risks would improve its accuracy and effectiveness. 
The second question considers whether the underwriting risks of insurers are 
affected by company characteristics. Insurers vary in terms of their structure and 
objectives and this could cause their risk levels to vary. Wang and Faber (2006) for 
example, observed that large stock companies, compared with mutual insurers, have 
more pressure on earnings and have greater discretion in estimating their reserves. 
Therefore, they are more susceptible to pricing and reserving risks. In this paper, 
insurers are categorized according to their risk characteristics to further test this 
proposition. Specifically, in the empirical analysis of a given line of business, a 
market is segmented by size, type, multi-lines, and multi-regions. The underwriting 
risks associated with these characteristics will then be discussed accordingly. 
The third question is whether actuarial reserving models contribute to the 
reserving risks. To investigate this question, we apply the classical chain ladder 
method to project incurred losses. The actuarial estimates will be compared with the 
actual results to gauge the accuracy of the actuarial models. In fact, the actuarial 
reserving models are simple and do not reflect the risk characteristics such as line-
specific and firm’s size-specific features. Therefore it is interesting to examine how 
well the actuarial methods can estimate the loss reserves in each market segment. The 
                                                 
7 Risk-Based Capital: Overview and Instructions Forecasting, Property and Casualty 2006. 
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evidence of varying accuracy among classes (e.g. size of company) of insurers would 
support the argument that the actuarial reserving model may not work well with the 
class of insurers whose risk is complex and/or subject to drivers other than the insured 
loss per se.  
The final ultimate question is whether insurance regulators should consider the 
refined market segments by insurers’ firm structure and objectives for the RBC 
formula. To answer this question, we conduct tests using credibility theory to 
investigate the implication of refined segments relative to industry-wide regulation. In 
particular, we apply credibility theory to test whether the underwriting risks of 
insurers are homogenous for an entire industry or if they are segment-specific. Our 
scope of analysis will go further than simply the size of a company as proposed in 
Solvency II; we also segment the market by type of company, specialist expertise, and 
the geographic distribution or business. 
We find that, in a given accident year, the pricing and reserving errors are 
positively correlated, especially in long-tailed lines of business. The results imply that 
under-estimation (over-estimation) of loss reserves, whether it is deliberate or not, 
will cause total losses incurred by insurers to be underestimated (overestimated), and 
thus the prices to be understated (overstated). In addition, we learn that the pricing in 
an accident year is associated with the loss reserve adjustment that occurred in the 
same year. 8 The results suggest that insurers increase (reduce) loss reserves as prices 
are rising (decreasing) and vice versa.   
 We also find that in a given accident year, large insurers, stock insurers, and 
multi-state insurers, in general, exhibit a strong correlation between price and reserve 
errors. However, when we focus on the timing of price changes and loss reserve 
                                                 
8 Accident-year data ties incurred losses (and the associated premiums earned) to the year when losses 
are incurred. 
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adjustment, only size of insurers appears to be a factor that influences the interaction 
between price changes and loss reserve adjustments. Furthermore, we apply 
credibility theory to test whether segmenting the insurance market by size, firm 
structure, number of lines, and number of states written is an effective method for 
grouping the pricing and reserving risks. We find that, in general, the pricing risk and 
reserving risk are marginally more homogenous within a market segment when size, 
type and number of states are employed as criteria for market segmentation. In 
contrast, we do not find that the number of lines of business is an effective criterion 
for segmenting the pricing risk and reserving risk.  
The empirical results also indicate that, in general, the classical actuarial 
reserving method such as the Chain-Ladder method likely contributes to loss reserve 
errors when there is a change in the loss development pattern and the magnitude of 
the errors is worse for large insurers. 
Finally, we find that our proposed measurement method for the product 
diversification benefit provides support for the notion that the diversification benefit 
on the incurred losses increases with the number of lines in the portfolio. Yet, the 
diminishing returns tend to decrease the diversification benefit on the incurred losses 
for insurers that write the business in more than six of the selected lines. To the 
contrary, our proposed measure does not provide clear evidence that writing business 
in many product lines increases the product diversification benefit with respect to 
adverse loss development. We do find that the diversification benefit for both incurred 
losses and loss development is higher for larger insurers. Hence, for risk management 
and regulatory purposes, a stronger case can be made for considering firm size than 
product diversification. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
extant literatures on underwriting cycle, reserving cycle, and their interaction. Section 
3 explores underwriting risks in the context of behavioral theories of 
finance/economics. Section 4 contains background information on the NAIC and 
rating agencies’ approach for premium and reserve risks. Section 5 lays out the 
hypothesis construction. Section 6 describes our dataset and the variables used in the 
analysis. It also explains the methodologies we use for testing our hypotheses testing. 
Section 7 presents and discusses our empirical results. Section 8 summarizes our 
results, presents our conclusions, and further discusses their implications.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Underwriting Cycle 
The property-casualty insurance industry is well known for its pattern of price 
movement, the so-called “underwriting cycle”. The underwriting cycle refers to the 
rising and falling pattern of prices, and therefore pricing risks, and the availability of 
insurance contracts. In soft markets, the insurance supply is abundant with lower 
prices and relaxed underwriting standards. Increased switching of insurance carriers 
by customers and less refined risk assessment in underwriting can be expected in this 
period. In hard markets on the other hand, the insurance supply is tightened, as 
reflected by the increase in prices and stricter underwriting standards. The severe 
conditions of the hard market can dismay both insurance buyers faced with higher 
prices and the decreased availability of insurance. 
 The key drivers found in the literature on the underwriting cycle phenomenon 
are supply shifts (capital constraints), volatility of losses, solvency constraints, 
interest rates, market imperfection, imperfect knowledge of the risk and correlation of 
underwriting performance to volume at times, and the behavioral aspects of insurers’ 
pricing and coverage decisions. Many studies explicitly or implicitly assume a pricing 
model in testing hypotheses regarding the underwriting cycle. The pricing models are 
based on loss uncertainty, insurer capital and economic factors. 
Understanding the insurance pricing model provides insights into the factors 
insurers consider in setting prices. Researchers then apply the knowledge about these 
pricing factors in their analysis of the underwriting cycle. The literature uses 
alternative pricing models including the financial model, the capacity constraint 
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model, the financial quality model, the option pricing model, the actuarial model, the 
economic model, and the behavioral model. Each model has unique assumptions and 
implications about pricing factors. Their implications differ in terms of short-run and 
long-run profitability. It is shown that all alternatives are relevant to the existence of 
the underwriting cycle, yet in distinct aspects.  
Choi, Hardigree and Thistle (2002) present the alternatives of the insurance 
pricing model that appear in the underwriting cycle research. Not taking into account 
the behavioral model, they found that in general these pricing formulas have the same 
form, i.e., the expected loss plus a short-run deviation from the long-run equilibrium. 
More details about all alternative models for the underwriting cycle study will be 
given in the following subsections. 
2.1.1. Actuarial Model 
The actuarial pricing models are based on the premium principle. The 
principle states that premiums are determined according to the targeted probability of 
default. That is, the risk premium charged by the insurer is the fund that allows the 
insurer to maintain a predetermined default probability. There are two major pricing 
models based on this principle: the standard deviation premium model and the utility 
premium model. 
a) Standard Deviation Based Model 
In this model, the policy premium is equal to the actuarial fair price, plus a 
standard deviation based loading. The explicit formula is: 
LLP σαμ ⋅+=  
where P = premium; Lμ = expected present value of losses; α = safety loading; Lσ = 
standard deviation of losses.  
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b) Zero-Utility Model 
The principle underlying this model posits that insurers set prices in a utility 
maximizing framework (Bowers et al, 1986; Bühlmann, 1970; and Gerber, 1979). The 
premium charged must be adequate to compensate the insurer for holding risks. 
Explicitly, the premium must be set high enough so the insurer derives as much utility 
from being in the market as not being in the market.. A simple example of the 
premium formula based on this principle is: 
2
LLP σλμ ⋅+=  
Where P = premium; Lμ = expected present value of losses; λ = the risk aversion 
parameter. The zero-utility principle assumes a perfectly competitive market. The risk 
premium increases with the variance of risk and decreases with the amount of surplus 
in the short-run. The participation constraint is binding in the long run. 
2.1.2. Financial Models 
The financial insurance pricing models were first introduced through the 
concept of Insurance Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) developed by Cooper 
(1974), Biger and Kahane (1978), Fairley (1979), and Hill (1979). The ICAPM is the 
combination of balance sheet and CAPM rate of return on the insurer’s equity. The 
result is as follows: 
])~([)~( fmufu rrErkrE −+−= β  
where  )~( urE  = expected underwriting return; )~( mrE = expected return on the market 
portfolio, fr = risk-free rate of interest; )~(/)~,~( mmuu rVarrrCov=β = the beta of 
underwriting profits; k = the liabilities-to-premiums ratio. 
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Myers and Cohn (1987) combined ICAPM with the Discounted Cash Flows 
(DCF) by arguing that k in ICAPM is an approximation of the DCF approach. Their 
multi-period pricing model is: 
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Where P = premium paid by policyholders for insurance coverage; L = total amount 
of losses under the policy; Ci = the proportion of losses paid at time i; Lr = loss 
discount rate; fr = risk-free rate of interest; z = tax rate for investment and 
underwriting income; E = investment and underwriting income. 
Basically, the price according to the financial pricing model can be expressed as the 
expected present value of claims plus policy expenses.  
The financial pricing model assumes a perfect capital market and a perfectly 
elastic supply in the short run. In particular, capital markets adjust quickly after loss 
shock. The underwriting profits are founded on the assumption that there is no default 
risk to the insurer. Some studies in the literature imply this pricing model in studying 
the underwriting cycle, especially in the effect of price regulation (Venezian, 1985; 
Cummins and Outreville 1987; Tennyson, 1993; Gron, 1994). By assuming that 
insurers price their product based on the financial model, there exists evidence that 
regulatory lag such as prior approval can produce cyclical patterns even in a rational 
expectation setting.  
2.1.3. Capacity Constraint Model 
Stewart (1984) and Bloom (1987) developed two informal capacity-constraint 
models. They formalized the idea that "lack of capacity" causes underwriting cycles. 
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Both models depend upon the shifting of insurance supply curves to explain the 
underwriting cycle. In contrast to the financial model, capacity constraint models are 
based on the assumption that the capital market is imperfect (Doherty and Garven, 
1992; Cummins and Danzon, 1992; Winter 1988, 1991a., 1994; Doherty and Posey 
1993; Gron 1994; Froot and Stein, 1998). However, the zero default probability is 
implied in this model. The entry and exit costs for capital are deterrents of insurer 
bankruptcy, and the industry is hypothesized to survive through the period of the soft 
market.  
Assuming that insurance firms are risk neutral, the capacity constraint model 
theory illustrates the cycle phenomenon via the capital process. The high cost of 
raising new equity externally implies that firms accumulate surplus internally and 
hold that excess capacity to remedy the unexpected need of new equity in the future. 
The high prices that appear during the hard market partially come from the firm’s 
surplus accumulation scheme. However, the period of hard market ends when enough 
capital has been accumulated in the industry. According to capacity constraint theory, 
supply is scarce when there is loss shock or an incident that depletes capital. In the 
short-run, capital shortage and the expensive cost of raising new equity externally 
shift the supply curve to the left which consequently increases the price. Nonetheless, 
the surplus will be recovered through the profit gained from the high prices in the 
hard market. The industry capacity will accumulate and the surplus curve will shift 
back to the “normal” level in the long-run.  
Evidence of capacity constraint theory was found in the literature. Doherty and 
Garven (1992) examined the relationship between interest rates, insurer capital 
structure, and insurance pricing as drivers of underwriting cycles. They showed that 
changes in interest rates simultaneously affect the insurer’s capital structure and the 
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equilibrium underwriting profit. They also found that insurance prices are inversely 
related to interest rates, which is consistent with the capacity constraint hypothesis. 
Cummins and Danzon (1992) suggested that the hard market arises from the need of 
capital to recuperate from depletion after loss shock. However, new capital will 
continue flowing into the market, and in the long run the capital supply will shift back 
to the “normal” state. Similarly, Gron (1994) documented that the sharp fall in 
capacity supply causes increases in future profitability in the short-run. Nevertheless, 
the financial models yield better predictions for prices in the long-run. Froot and Stein 
(1998) presented a study on the effects of capital shocks to insurers. Their model 
implies that the insurance price is a function of its capital. Due to the costs of raising 
external capital, the firm may have to reject profitable investment opportunities. They 
also suggest options for risk management: (i) holding capital ex ante, which is costly 
due to tax and agency costs, (ii) engaging in costly hedging (reinsurance) transactions, 
and (iii) adjusting the exposure through investment policies.  
2.1.4. Financial Quality Model 
The financial quality model is an extension of the capacity constraint model. 
Assuming that a firm has an optimal capital structure, this model suggests that default 
risk is endogenous and affects insurance prices in the long-run (Harrington and 
Danzon 1994; Cagle and Harrington 1995). The model incorporates the idea that 
insolvency risk depends on the amount of an insurer’s capital due to the uncertainty of 
losses. Similar to the capacity constraint model, shocks to the surplus shift supply in 
the short-run. While capacity constraint theory views the price of insurance as a 
function of market surplus, the financial quality theory considers it as a function of 
the firm’s surplus. According to the financial quality theory, demand shifts in 
response to loss shock to insurers, yet the effect of the demand shift is less than the 
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effect of the supply shift. The increase in prices after surplus shock is expected only in 
the short-run. Prices however are expected to be positively dependent upon the firm’s 
surplus in the long run when the supply has adjusted to the normal level.  
High levels of surplus, or financial quality, raises customers’ confidence; they 
therefore are willing to pay more. Cummins and Danzon (1997) applied this model 
type in their research. Imposing a specific capital market imperfection, they 
hypothesized that in order to meet target leverage ratios, insurers charge new 
policyholders higher premiums after the adverse loss shock. The market imperfection 
in consideration is that the benefit to financial quality, resulting from the added capital 
from the new and renewal policies, is diluted by the liability from the existing polices. 
In other words, the new policyholders who pay higher premiums do not receive the 
full benefits in terms of the financial quality for which they pay. The old 
policyholders, on the other hand, gain benefits from less insolvency risk, but pay no 
additional premiums. The authors’ findings suggest that the insurers’ price increasing 
and reserve strengthening during the liability crisis period (1984-1985) corresponded 
to the surplus level. In addition, they argued that price regulation can cause the 
insurance availability crises and can impede the price adjustment to the normal level.  
2.1.5. Option Pricing Model 
The insurance option pricing model developed from the thought that insurance 
coverage can be expressed as risky debt. Payments under primary insurance policies 
are triggered by changes in the value of insured assets. The option pricing model 
recognizes the default risk of insurers which can be expressed as a put option on 
assets of the firm.  
Assuming that claim costs can be approximated by a Brownian motion 
process, the insurance policy is a call option spread, paying 
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[ ] [ ]{ }UYMaxMYMax −−− ,0,0  at maturity, where Y = losses, U = maximum limit, 
and M = fixed retention amount. The Black-Scholes approach is then applied in 
calculating the formula of premiums. 
A crucial application of option modeling in the insurance literature is the 
insolvency risk analysis (Sommer, 1996; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Phillips, 
Cummins, and Allen, 1998). The policy pricing is established on the put-call parity 
formula: 
[ ]),,(),,( ττ τ LAPLeLACA fr −+= −  
where A = the value of firm assets; L = the value of firm liabilities; C(A,L,τ) = a call 
option on asset A, with striking price L, and time to maturity τ; P(A,L,τ) = a put option 
on asset A, with striking price L and time to maturity τ. 
The basic concept of the option pricing model is that policy price is equal to 
the expected present loss plus insolvency put which is the option on the assets of the 
insurer.  The option pricing model and the financial quality model are similar in that 
insurance coverage can be thought of as risky debt. In contrary to the financial quality 
model, the price from option modeling would fall as surplus decreases, both in the 
long-run and short-run. Cummins and Danzon (1997) extended the basic option model 
to the case of multiple liabilities. Their empirical tests provided evidence that the 
price of insurance is inversely related to insurer default risk, and that prices declined 
in response to the loss shocks of the studied period. Phillips, Cummins, and Allen 
(1998) proceeded a similar analysis on multiple-line insurers. Their empirical findings 
were consistent with the option model hypotheses: prices varied across firms 
depending upon overall-firm default risk and the concentration of business among 
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subsidiaries. However, within a given firm, prices did not vary by line after 
controlling for line-specific liability growth rates.9 
2.1.6. Behavioral Model 
The behavioral model is an important theory which is a major focus of this 
research. Unlike economic models, the behavioral model explains the underwriting 
cycle based on the principle that insurers view the market from their own standpoints. 
Their differing perceptions of the market result in varying insurance prices. 
Essentially, the behavioral model is founded on the thought that “Insurance supply is 
as psychological as it is financial” (Stewart , 1984). 
Stewart (1984) claimed that the underwriting cycle is perpetual to some extent 
because of the “lack of information” and “lack of coordination” among insurers. 
Individual insurers cannot know the precise amount that they should supply. 
Furthermore, individual insurers have different information and different cost 
structures, and therefore different perceptions and expectations of future profits or 
losses development. Each insurer’s unique perceptions prevent the market from 
reaching equilibrium in which there is no cycle in the long-run.  
 Fitzpatrick (2004) published a keynote paper on the behavioral aspect of 
underwriting cycles. The main idea of his paper is that the underwriting cycle is a 
consequence of the interactions between market participants. He summarized that the 
underwriting cycle is unique for a single insurer and market sector, and is at root the 
result of managerial judgments. Competition for revenue and market share, 
compensation structures, and game power among various participants within the 
insurance companies are the behavioral factors that drive the underwriting cycle. He 
                                                 
9 The authors use loss reserve weighted average of the industry-wide growth rates by line as a proxy for 
line-specific liability growth rates. 
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concluded that underwriting results are based on three factors: “(i) underwriters’ 
motivation from financial reward and fear of losing employment, (ii) internal agency 
influences, and (iii) pressures from insurance agents and brokers on the pricing 
behavior of insurers.”  
Feldblum (1999) pointed out that competitive strategy is a cause of the 
underwriting cycle :  
“Insurer strategies during profitable years drive rates down; 
changed strategies during poor years push rates up,” 
The pricing strategy of an insurer can change the market price. For example, an 
insurer who has profitable years may offer low prices and consequently gain business. 
Due to the competitive nature of the insurance market, peer insurers would have to 
lower their prices in order to sustain their businesses, which eventually drive down the 
market price. 
In general, insurers determine prices according to two alternatives of pricing 
strategy: maintaining market share and maintaining profitability.  Since the insurance 
market is competitive, insurers who decide to maintain market share would manage 
their underwriting so as to afford pricing at such lower, competitive rates (Fitzpatrick, 
2004). Moreover, Wang and Faber (2006) discovered that maintaining market share 
can increase the premium inadequacy. They conducted simulation tests and found that 
if insurers kept the aggregate premium constant while reducing premium rates and 
increasing the number of policies, the pricing risk would increase dramatically. 
On the other hand, if the insurers decide to maintain profitability, their pricing 
would be calculated from the associated risks. This pricing strategy might result in 
relatively high prices. By paying attention to the profitability per unit exposure, the 
insurers can have more confidence in the adequacy of their premiums. Unfortunately, 
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the insurers that seek to maintain profitability are likely to charge high prices relative 
to their competitors, especially when the market price is low. These high prices can 
cause them to lose market share to their competitors. The decrease in portfolio size 
will affect the risks of overall firm. Therefore the insurers who choose either of these 
strategies should consider pricing risk in both exposure unit and portfolio as a whole. 
The optimism of insurers also influences insurance pricing cycle (Winter, 
1988; Gron, 1989, 1990; Harrington and Danzon, 1994; Feldblum, 1999; Bulow and 
Klemperer, 2002; Fitzpatrick, 2004; Conger and Wolstein, 2004; Wang and Faber, 
2006). The optimism of an insurer denotes the insurer’s "attitudes," "expectations," 
and "perceptions." Winter (1988, 1989) and Gron (1989, 1990) addressed these issues 
in explaining the timing and length of the high-price phase. Feldblum (1999) found 
that an individual insurer’s degree of optimism may increase or decrease in different 
years. Conger and Wolstein (2004) conducted a survey of actuaries and underwriters 
in the property-casualty industry where they found that actuaries and underwriters do 
exhibit overconfidence about their knowledge, implying the existence of a 
relationship between the degree of optimism and price adequacy.  
In view of moral hazard or “winner’s curse”, an insurer may intentionally 
appear “optimistic” and under-price insurance contracts in the current period in order 
to increase market share. This action intensifies price competition in the market 
(Harrington and Danzon, 1994; Browne and Hoyt, 1995; Fitzpatrick, 2004; Baker, 
2005). The inadequate premiums could later bring the insurers difficulty when 
liquidating their provisions. Harrington and Danzon (1994) developed and tested 
hypotheses based on this rationale using data from the general liability industry. They 
found evidence that supports the moral hazard hypothesis. Their results also imply 
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that applying regulatory discipline to insurers who charge low prices and who possess 
high default risks would improve market price stability.  
Finally, the interest rate also plays a role on the behavior of insurers. Insurance 
companies invest part of their premiums as reserves in “incurred but not reported” 
(IBNR). Surprisingly, Fitzpatrick (2004) found that investment income from such 
investment often surpasses profits from underwriting. He observed that given 
insurers’ concern over stability of returns, investment returns can be a significant 
driver of the underwriting cycle. When the interest rate increases, the insurers can 
continue to write at low prices (which extends the soft market period) even if faced 
with negative underwriting margins. On the other hand, a decrease in the interest rate 
can pressure insurers to increase premium rates in order to compensate for their losses 
of investment income, and thus contributing to the arrival of the hardening period.  
2.2. Reserving cycle 
Reserving is a key risk that affects insurers’ balance sheets and can have 
adverse effects on insurer capital. The estimation error of loss reserves is persistent 
and seems to have a cyclical pattern. We call this cyclical pattern of loss reserve error 
the “reserving cycle”. 
Explanations for loss reserve mis-statements have received extensive interest 
from researchers (Anderson, 1973; Smith, 1980; Stanard, 1985; Weiss, 1985; Grace, 
1990; Beaver and McNichols, 1998; Beaver, McNichols and Nelson 2003; UK 
working party, 2003; Grace and Leverty, 2005; Wang and Faber, 2006). Significant 
discussion in the literature exists on the causes of loss reserve mis-statement. The 
studies are based on two major subjects: (i) imperfect actuarial reserving techniques 
and (ii) loss reserve manipulation by insurers. 
 37
2.2.1. Actuarial Reserving Model Risk 
Insurers apply actuarial reserving methods to project the frequency, severity 
and timing of claims. There are a number of projection techniques available to 
estimate loss reserves, such as the chain ladder, the Bornhuetter-Ferguson model, and 
the Taylor separation method. However, the actuarial methodology itself can be a 
source of loss reserve inaccuracy because the actuarial methods are based on past 
experiences which may not correctly represent current information.  
Studies have found that actuarial reserving models are likely to institute time-
dependent patterns into loss reserve estimation (Stanard, 1985; UK working party, 
2003; Wang and Faber, 2006). Stanard (1985) conducted a simulation test of 
prediction errors of four simple loss reserve estimation techniques: the age-to-age 
factor method, modified Bornhuetter-Ferguson model, adjustments to total known 
losses, and the additive model. The theoretical and simulated results suggested that 
the age-to-age factor method yields biased estimates and is inferior to the three other 
methods.  Schiegl (2002) used Monte Carlo simulation to create a run-off table. His 
results show that the Chain-Ladder reserves and Monte Carlo simulated reserves are 
deviated statistically. 
  A UK working party (2003) confirmed the existence of the reserving cycle in 
the UK from 1985 to 2001. One of their hypotheses stated that the reserving cycle is a 
consequence of errors resulting from actuarial reserving methods. By comparing the 
incurred loss derived from the different actuarial methods, i.e., Paid Chain-Ladder, 
Incurred Chain-Ladder, and Incurred Bornhuetter-Ferguson, they found that all of the 
methods produced a reserving cycle in marine and liability, but weak evidence of the 
cycle in the property line.  
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Wang and Faber (2006) proposed similar hypotheses. They illustrated plots of 
estimated reserve derived from popular actuarial reserving methods such as the 
Chain-Ladder method. Using a sample of insurers, their results showed that the 
selected actuarial reserving models did not perform well with any company 
characteristics. In particular, they found that the Chain-Ladder method worked quite 
better for small companies compared to large companies. In liability lines, the 
Bornhuetter-Ferguson reserving method tended to provide under-reserving in the 
early years if the price was underestimated, which again could aggravate the reserving 
risk. This implies that the actuarial reserving method exacerbates the reserving cycle 
if the underwriting cycle effect is not recognized.  
2.2.2. Loss Reserve Manipulation 
Another hypothesis regarding loss reserve errors is that the loss reserve is in 
some way manipulated by insurers. On the basis of insurers’ behaviors and the market 
atmosphere, researchers have proposed seven crucial drivers to explain the existence 
of these errors (Anderson, 1973; Smith, 1980; Weiss, 1985; Grace, 1990; Cummins 
and Grace, 1994; Penalva, 1998; Beaver and McNichols, 1998; Gaver & Paterson, 
1999; Beaver, McNichols and Nelson, 2003; Grace and Leverty, 2005). These drivers 
are income smoothing incentives, economic environments, tax-saving incentives, 
regulatory solvency constraint, price regulation, and growth incentives. 
Documented cases have shown examples where insurers have advertently 
manipulated loss reserves with the intention of smoothing the reported underwriting 
results (Anderson, 1973; Smith, 1980; Weiss, 1985; Grace, 1990). Smith (1980) and 
Beaver and McNichols (1998) found evidence that discretionary loss reserve accruals 
are positive-serially correlated. Such time-dependency implies that loss reserves do 
not accurately reflect all information. Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2003) 
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extended those studies and documented that property-casualty insurers showed 
tendencies of income smoothing through loss reserves. They found evidence that loss 
reserves are managed across the entire distribution of earnings and that small profit 
firms understate loss reserves relative to highest earning firms. Results also suggested 
that public and mutual companies manage loss reserve while private companies do 
not.   
Loss reserve manipulation motivated by tax reductions has been widely 
discussed in the literature. Weiss (1985) and Grace (1990) stated that the IRS has 
monitored loss reserves to prevent such misbehavior.  Grace (1990), Cummins and 
Grace (1994) and Penalva (1998) found evidence of a relationship between loss 
reserve errors and tax minimization involving the use of loss reserves to reduce 
insurers’ tax liability. Gaver and Paterson (1999) provided evidence that incentives to 
manage taxable income remained stable even in a changing regulatory environment. 
Similarly, the incentive of loss reserve manipulation owing to tax reduction has been 
found among UK insurers (Diacon, Fenn, and O’Brien, 2003).  
Furthermore, Petroni (1992), Penalva (1998), Gaver and Paterson (1999, 
2004), and Nelson (2000) found evidence in the property-casualty industry that loss 
reserve understatement is more prevalent among financially weak insurers than 
financially healthy ones. Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2003) used the revised 
estimate for the unbiased expectation of losses to calculate discretionary loss reserve. 
They documented that both financially distressed and financially healthy insurers 
understated loss reserve accrual through loss reserve management. The loss reserve 
understatement however, is more pronounced in the sample of healthy insurers.  
Regulatory solvency requirements can also produce an incentive to manage 
loss reserve. Gaver and Paterson (1999) found that the Risk-Based Capital solvency 
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requirements in 1992 weakened the incentives to under-reserve due to solvency 
margins improvement. According to Gaver and Paterson (2004), insurance companies 
manage loss reserves to avoid regulatory intervention. This reserve manipulation was 
done to achieve less than four IRIS ratios10 violation and provide some time for them 
to mend their financial conditions. Nelson (2000) indicates that state price regulations 
trigger loss reserves understatements. His results suggest that insurers in states with 
prior approval under reserve by discounting in order to afford charging the 
competitive rates.  
Grace and Leverty (2005) integrated various theories of reserve manipulation 
incentives as had been proposed in the literatures. In contrast to previous studies, their 
results indicate that the motivation of reserve errors does not come from the 
avoidance of regulatory ratio violations.  Managerial quality as measured by revenue 
efficiency does not adequately explain the reserve errors. The authors also suggested 
that insurers are likely to overstate reserves in the regulated lines since insurers 
increase their loss reserves to attain profitable rates. In addition, they found that 
IBNR, which are difficulties in estimation, are not the sources of reserve 
manipulation. 
2.3. Underwriting Cycle vs. Reserving Cycle 
The reserving cycle appears to move together with the underwriting cycle. 
This observation encourages an idea concerning the correlation between pricing risk 
and reserving risk. The UK working party (2003) and Wang and Faber (2006) 
provided evidence that a tendency exists for insurers to overstate loss reserves when 
                                                 
10 The Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) is set of financial ratios has been used by 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) since the middle 1970s. The IRIS ratios are 
used for determining whether a firm needs a solvency scrutiny. Most researchers suggest that an insurer 
is financially weak if four or more ratios are outside the proper bounds. 
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underlying loss ratios are low and to understate the reserves when underlying loss 
ratios are high. This finding comes as no surprise because loss reserves and premium 
rates tend to be theoretically related. In theory, loss reserve takes free capital out of 
the market, meaning that insurers lose some opportunities to write business because 
they have to use some of their capacities for reserving. This reduction in capacity 
results in a lower supply of insurance, and by law of demand, higher prices. 
Furthermore, redundant reserves in current years cause a release of reserves that flows 
into surplus years later. Consequently, loss reserve errors may cause insurers to adjust 
their rates in the future (Ho, 1999). The releases of loss reserves, especially in the soft 
market, can lead to lower rates. On the other hand, targeted premium rates can be a 
cause of the reserve errors. Insurers may “cook” their loss reserve books in order to 
justify the targeted premium rates (see, for example, Nelson, 2000). The empirical 
evidence of loss reserve manipulation as a consequence of incentives of smoothing 
earnings is consistent with the co-movement pattern underwriting cycle and reserving 
cycle. 
Wang and Faber (2006) made a similar discussion about under-reserving as 
being more of a consequence of financial status rather than as a cause. They indicated 
that adverse reserve developments could be a consequence of under-pricing, 
motivated by market competition and/or optimism. When prices are incorrectly 
estimated, reserves are calculated as if the prices were correct. Hence, when insurance 
contracts are under-priced, reserves are under estimated as well. When the hard 
market begins, insurance prices improve and insurance companies possess the funds 
for loss reserve revision.  
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2.4. NAIC Risk-Based Capital Model 
Beginning in the early 1990s, NAIC adopted a formula for determining the 
minimum capital requirement needed by an insurance company to help regulators 
with solvency issues. Nonetheless researchers have found that the RBC system itself 
is imperfect and could create incentives for excessive risk-taking by insurers 
(Cummins, Harrington, and Klein, 1991; Cummins, Harrington, and Niehaus, 1993a; 
Madsen, 2002; Wang and Faber, 2006). Three key limitations of NAIC RBC 
standards are: 
• The NAIC capital charge is derived from book valuations of asset and 
liabilities, and uses a one-year time frame. 
• It is simple and does not deal well with diversification. 
• The model is quite static and is a lagging indicator. 
Since financial-based information is used in calculating capital charge, it may 
be biased due to the statutory effect. In addition, an insurance company’s credibility 
when reporting the factual data to regulators is questionable. The financial 
information reported to regulators includes actuarial opinion and independent auditor 
review. However, as both are hired by the insurance company, and the information is 
provided by the company, the analyses are possibly biased in favor of the insurer. A 
possible bias is that the analyses yield results that justify the risk-based capital system. 
The insurance regulator uses the information and analyses received from the company 
in the RBC calculations. Since the information applied might be biased, the results of 
capital charged will then also be biased. Even though the actuarial opinion is reported, 
the regulator does not have the resources to review and thoroughly scrutinize the data. 
Therefore the current RBC system seems to be “garbage in garbage out”. 
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Madsen (2002) suggested that the NAIC’s RBC itself can encourage insurer 
misbehavior. The purpose of the study was to examine the effects of asset allocation 
for property-casualty insurance on the RBC requirements. Loss reserves and 
premiums written play a key role in the RBC formula in the sense that the lower loss 
reserves and premiums written imply a higher capital-to-asset ratio, which is an NAIC 
solvency measure. He found evidence that an insurer is in fact focused on satisfying 
traditional regulator measures and that shareholder value can be destroyed in both the 
short-term and long-term. 
 Hodes, Neghaiwi, Cummins, Phillips, and Feldblum (1996), followed by 
Hodes, Feldblum, and Neghaiwi (1999) discussed the use of financial models 
employed by the NAIC for property-casualty insurance companies. The results 
showed that dynamic financial models play an important role for companies that write 
long-tailed lines of business which have fluctuating rate adequacy, severe competition 
and volatile consumer bases.  
Wang and Faber (2006) recognized the flaw in the risk-based capital 
framework in terms of its lack of premium and reserve adequacy adjustment. They 
proposed risk capital factors that instill the downside premium and reserve deficiency 
risk. This implementation is illustrated by U.S. private passenger auto liability and 
commercial auto liability lines. The risk capital factor based on their calculation is 
higher for commercial lines than personal lines, and much higher for commercial auto 
fleet compared to non-fleet. Insurers therefore must charge higher risk margins for 
lines that have higher premium deficiency risks. 
Researchers are also interested in the effectiveness of capital requirement and 
predictive power of solvency screening systems in property-casualty insurance 
(Grace, Harrington, and Klein, 1995, 1998; Cummins, Grace, and Phillips, 1997). 
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Grace, Harrington, and Klein (1995) provided evidence that using the Financial 
Analysis Solvency Tools (FAST) score is a superior means to identify financially 
distressed insurers than using the ratio of an insurer’s RBC to its actual surplus. They 
also found that including the RBC ratios in the insolvency prediction models in which 
the FAST score is embedded does not significantly increase prediction power. 
Cummins, Grace, and Phillips (1997) also found similar results. They compared the 
insolvency explanatory power of three approaches: RBC, FAST, and Cash flow 
simulation. Their results also indicated that the FAST system is superior to the RBC. 
The cash flow simulation however, can add dynamicity and dominates the ratio-based 
system of FAST and RBC.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. Underwriting Risk and Theory of Behavioral Finance/Economics 
The economic models conventionally assume that people are rational in the 
sense that they have coherent preferences and should make decisions in a specified 
fashion. In reality, the decision makings usually involve with the complicated 
situation, confusion, and emotional conditions which can lead the people to deviate 
from the rationality. That is, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) proposed the Prospect 
Theory to study such “irrational” behaviors in managing risk under uncertainty. They 
posit that deviations from rationality stem from emotion and perception. Moreover, 
the difference states of emotion and perception can make people to concentrate on 
each component of a problem separately rather than looking at the whole picture, so-
called “mental accounting”. Failure to recognize that the aggregate is a result of 
interaction among its components leads to the deviations from rationality.  
The Framing Effect states that people decision making depends upon the 
setting of problems. People exhibit risk-aversion when a choice is presented in one 
setting and display risk-lover when the same choice is framed in a different manner. 
For example, people are willing to take a risk when the problem is framed in view of 
gain and to avoid the risk when the same problem is framed in form of loss. Prospect 
Theory explains such asymmetry of decision making that people are not risk-averse, 
yet they are loss-averse. It is not the uncertainty that people try to avoid, rather they 
dodge from losing. He noted that people reveal a tendency to look at problems in 
pieces rather than in the aggregate. 
Based on the economic model of irrationality and the belief that investors do 
not always rationally trade off risk and return, researchers introduced a field of study 
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called “behavioral finance” to analyze investors’ behaviors. The investors sometimes 
behave in a way that consistent with the rational models but sometimes their actions 
are influenced by distinctive perceptions and emotional impulses. These rational and 
irrational behaviors are commonly observed in a capital market and are widely 
discussed in behavioral finance literatures. Since underwriting risks in the insurance 
industry are partially a product of insurers’ behaviors, we thus relate the theory of 
behavioral finance with the insurers’ underwriting conducts. 
Underwriting cycle is a phenomenon that is partly driven by insurers’ psyche. 
During the soft markets, insurers plunge into the low premium rate despite their 
reckoning that profit is not quite there. The unprofitable periods often persist until the 
most rational insurers exhaust their patience or when insurers are no longer able to 
survive with such low prices. Thus the hard markets arrive. 
We can view the cycle in a way that insurers overestimate insured risks some 
time and underestimate part of the time but do not overestimate or underestimate all 
of the time. Edward Miller (1977) reports that the difference in behavior depends on 
the amount of gain. Investors prefer the occasional large gains to the consistent small 
winnings. His findings can apply to the low price phenomenon in the insurance 
market. Insurers gamble by bearing loss during the soft market with the hope to gain 
large profit when the market turns to hard period. Large profits that they could gain in 
the future encourage them to gamble and face the underwriting loss in the soft market.  
Another reason for usual under-pricing in the soft market is that charging 
relatively high price will cost them the market share.  Mental accounting and fear of 
losing their customers and revenue persuade them to concentrate on the market share 
rather than overall risks to the company. The loss-aversion regarding the market share 
leads insurers to take risks by adhering to unprofitable prices in the fond hope that 
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some day the market will recover and make them whole. The focus on revenue can 
blind them from realizing the effect from the underwriting risk on other risks that 
could aggravate the risks of company as a whole. Besides, Shefrin and Statman 
(2000) report that the human psyche is split into short-term and long-term perspective. 
Peoples’ response is a consequence of weights assigned on future and immediate 
gratification. Since insurers, especially stock insurers, face the compulsive revenue 
and market share competition, they tend to appreciate satisfaction today more than the 
long-term value. 
In the context of overconfidence, experience, expertise, and learning do not 
eliminate biases from rational decision making. People tend to overestimate their 
intelligence and experience while believing that they usually display rationality. 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) proposed a theory of securities market 
under- and overreactions based on investor overconfidence about the precision of 
private information; and biased self-attribution11. Their empirical results indicate that 
overconfident investors overweigh the private information relative to the public 
signals, resulting in overreaction to the stock price. 
The errors in pricing and reserving can be partly a result of overconfidence. If 
an insurer begins with unbiased estimate of insured risk, new public information 
about the risk on average is considered as vindicating its private information.  The 
insurer then updates the confidence in her ability in a biased manner. In particular, it 
would earn more confidence in the private signal to which she overreacts in the 
future. The overconfidence will continue until new public information (market price) 
invalidates the private information and the insurer gradually agrees with the 
                                                 
11 According to attribution theory (Bem (1965)), people overweight events that vindicate their 
judgments and blame the events that disapprove their judgments on external noise or sabotage. Self-
attribution bias occurs when people attribute successful outcomes to their own skill but blame 
unsuccessful outcomes on bad luck. 
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fundamentals. Thus, biased self-attribution implies short-run overconfidence that 
causes a lag response to the fundamental prices and extends the period of soft or hard 
markets. In contrary, the reversal of reaction will arrive in long-term and the insurer 
adjusts insurance price according to the realization of true risks. 
In conclusion, behavioral finance fields of study apply psychology to better 
understand economic decisions. It helps analyze the underwriting cycle phenomenon 
in respect to rationality or lack of rationality in insurers’ response to market prices. 
The principle increasingly becomes the theoretical basis for the underwriting cycle 
and provides an explanation for the market behaviors that had been mysterious to 
researchers. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. Review of Premium and Reserve Risks under NAIC and Rating Agencies 
Approaches 
In 2004, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
released a draft of a global framework for insurer capital requirement, known as 
Solvency II. Solvency II aims to place the regulatory capital requirements of each 
company against its individual risk profile. This will encourage companies to 
implement their own internal risk models, enhance risk management, and be prudent 
about the strategy and operations of their business. 
In the United States, the NAIC has been employing the risk-based capital 
(RBC) to access the financial strength of insurers, and when needed, has the power to 
take prompt corrective action (The baseline of the NAIC risk-based capital 
requirement will be discussed in the following subsection). Rating agencies also 
contribute to risk-based capital calculation. For example, S&P applies its capital 
adequacy ratio (SPCAR) to analyze an insurer’s financial condition. The components 
of SPCAR are almost identical to those found in the NAIC RBC formula except that 
the S&P approach includes a risk charge for guarantee fund assessments. Similarly, 
A.M. Best introduced Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR), which is the ratio of 
the adjusted surplus to the net required capital for insurance companies. Both SPCAR 
and BCAR adjust surplus to an economic basis. 
Looking more closely at the BCAR model for underwriting risk, the loss and 
loss-adjustment-expense reserves and net written premium risks are considered in 
gauging a company’s underwriting exposure. For reserving risk, A.M. Best 
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emphasizes the adjusted reserve leverage and stability in loss development as a 
measure of reserving errors. In general, BCAR assigns significant weight on a 
company’s adjusted reserves, which emphasizes reserve adequacy and discounted 
reserves. In contrast to the NAIC risk-based capital, the size of the company and the 
risk inherent are also regarded in the formula. In addition, the required capital for 
premium written risk for each line of business integrates the line-specific risks, the 
company’s profitability and the company’s size. The model also includes an 
underwriting cycle adjustment in pricing risk.  
The following subsections introduce the baselines of capital requirement for 
property-casualty insurer in the U.S. and worldwide. More details about the NAIC 
basic capital formula for underwriting risk will be given to better understand regulator 
practice.   
4.1. Solvency II – Capital Requirements for Non-Life Insurers 
In the proposed Solvency II, the methodology for RBC requirements aims to 
place the regulatory capital requirements of each company against its individual risk 
profile. This will encourage companies to implement their own internal risk model, 
enhance risk management, and be prudent about the strategy and operations of their 
business. 
Solvency II also considers some key issues which relate to the idea of our 
thesis. The issues involve class (line) segmentation, size of company, and the 
underwriting cycle effect in capital calculation.  
(i) The class segmentation is based upon classes of business specified 
in the EU Insurance Accounts Directive.12  
                                                 
12 Tilinghast (Towers Perrin), 2006: “The current suggested class segmentation is based upon the 11 
classes of business specified in the EU Insurance Accounts Directive. The classes are accident and 
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(ii) Small companies are penalized by size-factors that increase the 
amount of capital required if the amount of expected business 
written in a particular line of business is less than a specified 
amount.  
(iii) The underwriting cycle is captured in the solvency capital 
requirement (SCR) calculation through the expected profits or 
losses allowance in the year following the valuation date. However, 
the proposed adjustment is inappropriate during turning points of 
the underwriting cycle. 
Some countries have included the Solvency II principles into their 
frameworks. We will look at the frameworks for non-life insurance in Switzerland 
and the U.K. as they embrace some interesting issues related to our study.  
In Switzerland, the reserving risk and current year risk are quantified 
individually for non-life insurance. For each line of business, claims in the current 
year are modeled based on parametric and stochastic internal data. The reserving risk 
is estimated using a shifted lognormal distribution. In the U.K., the Enhanced Capital 
Requirement (ECR) is comprised of capital charges on asset risk, pricing risk, and 
reserving risk. The capital requirement is derived from equalization reserves, a long-
term reserve that an insurance company keeps in the event of an unexpected 
catastrophe. In addition, the U.K. takes into account the effect of the underwriting 
cycle in valuing the underwriting risk. The market underwriting cycle is modeled by 
the AR2 process.  
                                                                                                                                            
health, motor-third party liability, motor other classes, marine, aviation and transport (MAT), fire and 
other damage of property, third-party liability, credit and surety, legal expenses, assistance, 
miscellaneous non-life insurance and inwards reinsurance.” 
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That U.S. regulator will look at the EU's Solvency II as a prototype for future 
supervision if the industry is not known. All in all, NAIC and EU insurance regulators 
have very similar frameworks. The former president of the NAIC, Alessandro Iuppa 
stated in a public hearing on Solvency II (June, 2006) that “The NAIC reiterates many 
of the fundamental themes of Solvency II – many of which resonate with the work 
being done at the NAIC and at the IAIS.” 
4.2. NAIC Risk-Based Capital Formula  
The risk-based capital formula reflects the financial soundness of an insurance 
company. The common risks identified in the NAIC property-casualty models include 
asset risk-affiliates (risk of default of assets for affiliated investments), asset risk-other 
(risk of default for debt assets and loss in market value for equity assets), credit risk, 
and underwriting risk. In addition, the risk-based capital for property-casualty also 
includes the risk of reserve deficiencies by considering an insurer’s excessive growth 
since companies that grow rapidly are likely to understate loss reserves.   
Like banking regulations, the NAIC applies factor-based regulatory capital 
requirements. Except for affiliate equity investment risk and off-balance sheet risk, 
which seems to be uncorrelated with the others, the NAIC formula incorporates the 
dependence structure between these risk categories by applying covariance 
calculations. This adjustment reflects the fact that the cumulative risk of several 
independent items is less than the sum of the individual risks and therefore reduces 
the risk-based capital amount.  
 The total required capital for property-casualty is: 
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    R0: Insurance affiliate investment and (non-derivative) off-balance-sheet 
risk 
    R1: Investment asset risk – fixed income investments 
    R2: Investment asset risk – equity investments 
    R3: Credit risk (non-reinsurance plus half reinsurance credit risk) 
    R4: Loss reserve risk, one half reinsurance credit risk, growth risk 
    R5: Premium risk13, growth risk 
We focus here on the capital formula for underwriting risk charges for they are 
the dominant portions of the risk-based capital formula and relevant to our thesis. 
Feldblum (1996) provided a summary of the NAIC risk-based capital formula for 
which we use as reference. 
4.2.1. Reserving Risk 
Not attempting to measure the reserve adequacy, the reserving risk charge in 
risk-based capital formula serves to measure the vulnerability of loss reserves to 
adverse developments. The calculations are performed separately by individual 
companies (not company group), Schedule P line of business, and statement data. 
The reserving risk charge is comprised of industry-wide and company-specific 
components. For each company, the adverse loss development ratio is calculated as: 
losessPaidlossesIncurred
lossesincurredInitialUltimate
reserveLoss
tdevelopmenlossAdverseratiotDevelopmenLossAdverse
−
−=
=
 
For each line of business on a certain statement date, individual company ratios are 
averaged (unweighted) to determine the average industry-wide ratio. Furthermore, for 
                                                 
13 In this paper, we refer to premium risk and loss reserve risk as pricing risk and reserving risk 
respectively.  
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each line of business, the implicit interest margin, or the difference between the 
discounted and undiscounted value of reserves, is calculated. The discounted loss 
reserves are determined using the method employed by the IRS with a flat 5% 
discount rate. The final capital charge of carried reserves is then determined as: 
Final Charge = (1 + company RBC percentage) * implicit interest margin 
where the company RBC percentage is calculated from industry-wide and company-
specific adverse loss development. 
Finally, the risk-based capital formula judgmentally allocates parts of 
reserving risk across lines. The basis for this is the relationship of aggregate industry 
reserves by line of business to the sum of aggregate industry reserves for all lines of 
business. 
4.2.2. Written Premium Risk 
As defined by Feldblum (1996), the written premium risk is “the risk that the 
company’s future business will be unprofitable, and that the company will have to 
cover underwriting losses with surplus funds.” Like the reserving risk charge, the 
written premium risk charge is comprised of average industry and company 
experience. For each line of business, the investment income adjusted average loss 
and loss adjustment expense ratios by accident year for the past ten years are applied 
as a measure of premium risk. For a company in a given line of business, the figure is 
therefore multiplied by the written premium in the most recent calendar year to obtain 
the capital charge for written premium risk. 
The overall capital charge for underwriting risk also takes into account some 
other factors. For example, the reserving risk (written premium risk) is adjusted to 
offset loss-sensitive business, claims-made business, loss (premium) concentration 
factor, and growth charge for reserving risk (premium risk).  
 55
CHAPTER 5 
 
5. Hypotheses Construct 
A major interest of our study is to investigate how the pricing risk and 
reserving risk are correlated and how insurers’ the interaction differ according to 
insurer risk characteristics which is classified by firm structure, line of business, and 
product and geographical diversification. The hypotheses will be laid out in the same 
order with the questions we posed in the introduction section. 
One of the foremost forces of the lack of certainty inherent in pricing is the 
insurers’ expectation on the risks. Insurers who are more optimistic will charge lower 
prices than those who are less optimistic. The “optimism” can also be influenced by 
the insurers’ incentives to engage in price competition. The management 
compensation which is often tied to volume, and expense management14 can motivate 
the insurers to be more optimistic towards the claim costs so that they can offer the 
competitive prices15. In a competitive market such as insurance industry, the market 
price therefore is driven down to the price offered by the most optimistic insurers 
which eventually leads to the soft market period. The insurers that charge higher than 
the market price will lose market share. In order to keep their customers, they will 
adjust their prices to the competitive levels even if the prices can be unprofitable.  
Moral hazard is another driver of pricing risk. The limited liability of 
insurance companies protects shareholders from losing more than the value of their 
shares and can lead insurance companies to take the risky step of selling insurance 
                                                 
14 Expense management requires branches to maintain an acceptable expense ratio which forces 
premium volume to remain at least constant. The objective to maintain the premium volume can have 
an effect on the price, given that the insurance industry is competitive. 
15 Our interviews with Chief Actuary Executives confirm that management appears to be optimistic 
about the written risks so that the company can afford the competitive rates. 
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below cost in order to increase market share. In addition, state insurance guarantee 
funds protect insurance sellers and buyers from the consequences of under-pricing. It 
can encourage insurance buyers to willingly buy a policy from the company that 
charges a low price.  
A driver of reserving risk that has been widely discussed in insurance 
literatures is that the loss reserve is in some way manipulated in accordance with 
incentives of smoothing earnings. The empirical findings of the income smoothing 
through loss reserve combined with the notion that the underwriting cycle and the 
reserving cycle move together (UK working party, 2003; Wang and Faber, 2006), we 
hypothesize that the pricing risk and reserving risk have a causal relationship. In a 
one-period time frame, insurers tend to overstate loss reserve when price is high in 
order to justify the targeted premium rate, and tend to understate the loss reserve 
when the underlying price is low. In conclusion, under-pricing will ultimately lead to 
adverse reserve development while over-pricing will finally lead to favorable reserve 
development. 
Theoretically, pricing risk and reserving risk are directly correlated. Insurers 
have to work with immature loss data (upper triangle) to estimate the insured losses 
and set the prices accordingly. Thus, underestimation of ultimate losses will lead to 
under-pricing. On the other hand, for long-tailed lines, such as workers’ compensation 
and other liability at the end of the first year, only a small percentage of losses have 
been reported. As a result, insurers use the estimated loss ratio to set reserves. Hence, 
under-pricing will lead to under-reserving which will show upward reserve 
development. That is, the incorrect estimates of insured losses will ultimately be 
shown in the form of loss reserve development.  
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The risk of underestimating reserves for unpaid losses also is associated with 
the risk of under-pricing. Under-estimation of loss reserves will cause total losses 
incurred by insurers to be underestimated and profits and surplus to be overstated. 
These errors can have further implications for insurers’ financial and market 
decisions. Importantly, insurers’ estimates of their historical losses play a significant 
role in their calculation of the prices they should charge in the future. Hence, 
underestimation of unpaid losses attributable to prior periods can lead to under-
pricing of insurance contracts in future periods.16  
Therefore, the hypothesis about relationship between pricing risk and 
reserving risk is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: For a given accident year, the accident-year loss ratio 
and ultimate loss development are positively correlated. 
Basically, we hypothesize that insurance prices and loss reserves are 
interactively determined at the underwriting point in time. The knowledge of the 
causal relationship between pricing and reserving will provide ideas about the leading 
indicators of the underwriting and reserving cycle which will be helpful for building 
the forward-looking RBC models. 
Based on historical data, it appears that the gross loss ratio of small insurance 
companies, including captives and risk retention groups, are lower than that of large 
companies. An explanation is that large insurers are likely to price risks on a fleet 
                                                 
16 In practice, pricing is generally done rather independently of the reserving process. The actuaries 
doing the pricing will use historical data, but it is generally broken down in finer detail than that used 
by the reserving actuaries. The pricing actuary needs to look at everything by state, territory, class, etc. 
The reserving actuary generally sets reserves on a more summarized level. The reserving actuary is free 
to use whatever methods he/she feels are appropriate to set the reserves. The pricing actuary may be 
constrained in how he/she arrives at the rates for those lines of business for which rates need to be filed 
by state insurance department requirements. Nevertheless, since both pricing and reserving actuaries 
use the similar loss data in their calculation and both of them are under the same market pressure, we 
still expect that pricing and reserving errors will be correlated. 
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basis and to resort to experience ratings. Unfortunately, underwriters and actuaries are 
not likely to see the loss and loss development which consequently limits their 
experiential knowledge (Wang and Faber, 2006). The lack of knowledge leads to a 
higher swing of individual loss ratio and loss development for large insurers. Since 
insurers who are deficient in expertise are likely to miscalculate the insured losses 
which affect both pricing risk and reserving risk, we expect that large insurance 
companies, who mostly use experience-based rating as their pricing basis, will show a 
stronger correlation between loss ratios (price) and loss development (loss reserve 
error).  
According to the above discussion, we form a hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of interaction between pricing and reserving 
risk differ by size of company owing to portfolio size and experiential 
knowledge, and the interaction is more apparent in large insurers. 
The distinct underwriting behavior is also hypothesized for different types of 
insurers, including publicly traded stock insurer, stock insurer, mutual insurer, risk 
retention group, reciprocal insurer, and alien subsidiary. Each type of insurance 
company possesses their own risk characteristics. Furthermore, pricing strategy is a 
key factor of premium inadequacy; we expect that companies whose pricing strategy 
is to maintain market share are more exposed to the pricing risk.17 The aim to 
maintain market share can impose an insurer to manage its earnings through loss 
reserve practice, which as a result enhances the correlation between prices and loss 
reserve adequacy. 
                                                 
17 Wang and Faber (2006) conducted a simulation test and documented that if an insurer keep the 
aggregate premium the same while reducing premium rate and increasing number of policies, the 
underwriting risk increases dramatically. 
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 Publicly traded stock insurers are more subject to earnings tension than other 
types of insurers due to the pressure from shareholders and the management 
compensation that ties to the firm profitability. The management of publicly traded 
stock insurers therefore focuses on short-term interest. Since publicly traded stock 
firms are concerned more with earnings combined with extensive reserve options, 
they are likely to maintain the market share and are more subject to pricing risk and 
reserving risk. Besides, senior executives who are focused on revenue and market 
share prefer to use capital to maintain revenue and market share in a soft market than 
giving dividends to shareholders or holding it in an investment account.  As the 
underwriting results of this type of insurer can be more volatile than for other types of 
insurers, we expect that the publicly traded stock insurers will display a relatively 
high correlation between loss ratio and loss development.  
Unlike publicly traded stock insurers, mutual insurers, which are owned by 
policyholders, are not dedicated to making profits in the form of dividends. Their final 
objective is to achieve the best possible returns and services for their member-
policyholders. Without the pressure from shareholders and profit-based compensation, 
the underwriting results of mutual insurers should be more stable than those of the 
publicly traded stock insurers. According to Mayers and Smith (2000), mutual 
companies have limited ability to raise capital and are less likely to write the risky 
lines. They find that mutual insurers have superior underwriting than the stock 
companies who own the short-term growth and earnings pressures. Harrington and 
Danzon (2000), on the other hand, points out that capital limitation of mutual 
companies raises disadvantages when competing with stock companies. 
However, mutual insurers may also have an incentive to compete for market 
share. The rationale for this claim is that a mutual insurer tends to pay just enough of 
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a dividend to current policyholders, but using most of the capital to cut prices in order 
to get new policyholders and to discourage existing policyholders from future price 
shopping (Baker, 2005).  
A risk retention group (RRG) is a type of insurance company formed for 
special purposes. The RRG is owned by its policyholders. Membership is often 
limited to people whose businesses share the same liability risks. The risk pool of this 
kind of company is comprised of similar risks and there exists little risk 
diversification. Risk Retention Groups in general are thinly capitalized. Thus they are 
not well cushioned in the event of a shortfall in loss reserves.18 Based on these 
reasons, we may see a high fluctuation of underwriting results in RRGs.  
The reciprocal insurer is “an unincorporated group of individuals, called 
subscribers, who mutually insure one another, each separately assuming his share of 
each risk.” The purpose of a reciprocal insurer is to minimize insurance costs with 
potential savings through safety programs (Reinmuth, 1964). Regarding reciprocal 
insurers, Norgaard (1964) stated that “these individuals generally are above average in 
property housekeeping, in their loss ratios, and in their desire to lower cost through 
safety.” According to his statement combined with the objectives, we speculate that 
underwriting results of reciprocal insurers should be in good condition. 
The last type of insurers considered in this paper is the alien subsidiary. Even 
though the alien insurers operate in the U.S., they view the U.S. market from an 
external standpoint. They are subject to the policies of their parent companies located 
abroad who own different economic features. Our hypothesis is thus based on the 
notion that the alien insurers might behave differently from domestic insurers.   
                                                 
18 Information from The Auto Club website, available at   
    http://www.theautoclub.com/warranty/rrg_vs_insurance.jsp 
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Focusing on interaction between pricing risk and reserving risk, we expect that 
the correlation between loss ratio and loss development will vary according to 
insurers’ type-specific underwriting behaviors. Our hypothesis about underwriting 
risks according to type of company is: 
Hypothesis 3: The correlation between insurers’ pricing and 
reserving risks differs by firm structure of company on account of 
their individual objectives and incentives; the interaction is more 
apparent in publicly traded stock insurers. 
The specialist expertise of an insurance company more or less depends on the 
number of lines of business written.  The insurers that write business in one or a few 
lines have more experience and knowledge about the losses, whereas the multiple-line 
companies undergo a “diminishing of knowledge” due to diversification. In other 
words, the multiple-line insurers may have more difficulty in recognizing 
underwriting risks in a certain line because the diversification effect thwarts the 
insurers from seeing the real risks of each line of business, and there is a lag time 
before the lack of knowledge shows up in loss ratio. However, writing business in a 
small number of lines may lessen the benefits gained from diversification. The 
portfolio theory which is fundamental to property/casualty business modeling 
underlines the diversification benefits from risk pooling. The number of lines written 
also implies risk diversification of the company’s portfolio. While the multiple-line 
insurers to some extent lack expertise, they potentially gain the benefits of 
diversification. Nevertheless, our hypothesis is based on the premise that the 
diminishing of knowledge can simply create more risk than the diversification offset. 
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Similarly, the number of states written indicates the degree of specialist 
expertise and geographic diversification. The insurers that write business in one or a 
few states have more geographical expertise about risks than the insurers that have 
business in many states. However, the insurers who operate in many states can gain 
the benefits of geographic diversification.  
We speculate that the writing business in many lines of business can be both 
beneficial and detrimental to the underwriting risks, and the link between pricing risk 
and reserving risk. Thus, our hypothesis about insurers’ geographic expertise and 
diversification is: 
Hypothesis 4: Interaction between pricing risk and reserving risk differ 
by number of lines and/or number of states written owing to the 
specialist expertise and risk diversification. 
In the context of interaction between pricing risk and reserving risk, the price 
level can be a consequence of loss reserve adjustments in a multi-period time frame. 
The reserve redundancy accumulated in the current year will cause a release of loss 
reserves that flows into the surplus some time in the future. The increase in surplus 
enables the insurers to reduce their premium rates afterward. On the other hand, the 
reserve insufficiency in the current year leads to high price in the future so that the 
insurer can afford the fund for loss reserve correction. Hence, the loss ratios level can 
be a consequence of reserve overstatement (understatement), and the reserve 
inadequacy (redundancy) from the previous years can affect the level of premium 
rates in the current year.  
Since the time lag of the inadequacy/redundancy to take an effect on pricing is 
unknown, we instead analyze the casual relationship in form of timing of loss reserve 
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adjustment. Suppose that redundancies of loss reserve in the past years take an effect 
in the current period. The release (accrual) of loss reserves will be shown by 
decreases (increases) in loss reserves of the past-year policies, or favorable (adverse) 
loss reserve adjustment. Loss reserves have a direct impact on the surplus account. 
Since the surplus determine prices, according to law of demand, the loss reserve 
amount tend to play an important role in pricing decisions. On the other hand, loss 
reserve errors can be a result of manipulation of the timing of loss recognition. The 
over-reserves from prior high rate years can be used to subsidize underwriting results 
when the prices are low. Therefore, a favorable loss adjustment is expected to be 
observed with a low price while an adverse loss reserve development should be 
observed with a high price.  
In the other direction, an increase in prices can lead to an increase in loss 
reserves. Whence premium rates rise, the funds obtained from higher prices can be 
used to correct the reserves that were underestimated in the past years. Thus high 
prices can lead to adverse reserve adjustment (increase in loss reserve), particularly in 
the case of insurers that entered the hard market in relatively strong financial 
condition.  
According to the discussion above, we speculate that there is link between 
price level and the decisions for loss reserve adjustment, i.e., we expect to see the 
favorable (adverse) loss reserve adjustment in low (high) rate year. Since we use loss 
ratio as a measure of insurance price, the greater the loss ratio implies the lower in 
price. Therefore the negative sign of the correlation between price level (accident-year 
net loss ratio) and reserve adjustment (one-calendar-year loss development) is 
expected. 
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Hypothesis 5: For a given year, the accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development are negatively correlated.  
Furthermore, we also speculate that the decision of loss reserve adjustment is 
more related to change in prices rather than from the price level. Under the same 
rationality for hypothesis 5, we expect that the negative (positive) loss reserve 
adjustments occur as prices are decreasing (increasing).  
Hypothesis 6: For a given year, change in accident-year loss ratio from 
prior year and one-calendar year loss development are negatively 
correlated.  
In the long-tailed line of business such as liability insurance, it is especially 
difficult to estimate the reserve by relying on the actuarial reserving model. Applying 
mathematical and statistical modeling to estimate losses, the actuaries can produce 
errors in the loss reserve estimation which inherently affect premium rates. The 
actuarial reserving models are based on historical data and the assumption that loss 
development patterns are similar to those in the prior years. Forecasts for the insured 
losses thus solely mirror the historical information but fail to reflect factors that can 
influence the losses in the upcoming period. For example, suppose that incurred losses 
decreased for the past five years and begins to increase in this year. To project the 
incurred losses for the forthcoming year, the actuarial models speculate that the losses 
would be decreasing as observed in the recent years. Failing to recognize the reversal 
in loss development pattern, the predicted losses therefore are undervalued and lead to 
further reserve take down. Likewise, if the incurred losses were rising in the past 
years and falling in the current year, the actuarial methods would yield the 
overestimation of the incurred losses and lead to further reserve accrual.   
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Nevertheless, not only does the actuarial estimate depend on the direction of 
the movement of the losses in prior years, it also depends on the rate of the growth of 
incurred losses. Therefore, we may observe the overestimation of losses in the year 
that loss changes from being decreasing to be increasing if the rate of the increase of 
loss in the current period is lower than the net increase rate of loss in the past nine 
years. As a result, both loss overestimation and underestimation can be observed 
regardless of change in the direction of the incurred losses.  
The incurred Chain-Ladder method will be taken as the representatives of the 
traditional actuarial reserving models. The errors created by the selected actuarial 
models will be compared among different company sizes. The philosophy behind this 
is that large insurers, whose behavioral matters are more complicated, are inclined to 
settle loss reserves away from the actuarial estimates.  
Hypothesis 7: The loss reserve error is partly a consequence of the 
limitations of the actuarial reserving model. The effect of the model 
risk is more pronounced for large insurers. 
Finally, as we theorize that insurers’ underwriting risks differ by the 
company’s risk characteristics, introducing these behavioral guidelines should enable 
an effective approach for risk assessment. As the current RBC formula estimates the 
required capital from the combination of industry-wide and company-specific risks, 
we thus suggest that refining market segments by risk characteristics should allow for 
better RBC requirements. 
Hypothesis 8: Building the refined market segments into the NAIC 
RBC formula for underwriting risk will allow for better risk 
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assessment, and therefore increase the accuracy of capital 
requirement. 
According to the discussion for hypothesis 4, we examine the potential for 
underwriting risks to “average out” when viewed as a portfolio. By writing the 
business in more than one line of product, an insurer can gain benefits from 
diversification, a reduction in risk of the overall portfolio (e.g., Markowitz, 1952). 
Within the insurance industry, product lines are indicated by the type of risk coverage, 
such as workers’ compensation insurance, auto insurance, homeowners insurance, etc. 
Therefore the risks in a portfolio of diverse insurers will be less than the risks inherent 
in writing only one line of product, given that the risks of the various lines are not 
directly related.  
Though the portfolio theory highlights the diversification benefits from risk 
pooling across geographic regions and across products, it tends to overestimate the 
benefit from diversification. Indeed, the diversification can prevent large multiple-line 
insurers from understanding the real characteristics of the individual underwriting 
risks. The difficulties to recognize the real risks as a result lead to the failure in 
establishing the effective management.  
Hypothesis 9: Diversification benefit increases with the number of 
lines of business. On the other hand, the lack of knowledge by writing 
many product lines can reduce the benefit from diversification. 
In summary, we propose that pricing risk and reserving risk interact with each 
other, and the degree of interaction varies according to company-specific risk 
characteristics. In addition, we aim to find a support for the hypotheses that the 
portion of the underwriting risks could stem from the unique risk characteristics in 
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each market segment. Therefore, it is important for regulators to understand these 
learnings for the further RBC model development.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. Dataset and Methodology  
6.1. Dataset and Definitions 
In our empirical analysis, we utilize U.S. property/casualty insurance data over 
the sample period 1991-2004. The financial data is taken from annual financial 
statements reported to the NAIC. The types of insurance companies are obtained from 
Best’s key rating Property/Casualty. NAIC and Best’s key rating datasets are merged 
by NAIC company codes, and only insurance companies that are present in both 
databases will be included in our samples.  
In our study of pricing and reserving risks, we focus on liability insurances 
because losses are difficult to estimate and the underwriting cycle is more evident in 
the liability lines. Specifically, a longer tail magnifies the uncertainty of pricing risk 
since liability claim costs is more difficult to predict the farther into the future. In 
addition, a longer tail magnifies the uncertainty of reserving risk as the assumptions 
used in calculation tend to change over time which could subsequently lead to a 
dramatic need for reserve adjustments, especially when future claim cost seem to be 
more expensive than what had been projected. 
 The liability lines of business considered in this thesis are workers’ 
compensation, other liability, commercial and multiple peril, commercial auto 
liability, private passenger auto liability, medical malpractice, and product liability. 
However, we include homeowners as a sample for property line. The homeowners 
market is driven by natural catastrophe and is also used as a benchmark for the 
analysis. 
 69
We apply some sample selection criteria to exclude insurance companies 
whose written premium is less than $1 million in the selected line. We browse the 
data list to identify and remove the insurance companies that are out of business and 
are not continually writing the business. The companies whose data are available for 
less than ten years are also excluded. Thus our final sample contains insurers who do 
the business consistently and who are actively involved with the market. 
We also classify the insurers by the average of accident-year direct and 
assumed (inclusive of reinsurance) earned premium. Small, midsize, large, and giant 
insurers are defined as the companies whose average of earned premium are less than 
25th percentile, between 25th and 75th percentile, between 75th percentile, and greater 
than 95th percentile, respectively.  
We use the accident-year direct and assumed loss ratio as a measure of pricing 
risk. The direct loss ratio is chosen for this study so that we can disregard the 
reinsurance effect because some companies may have better risk management through 
the reinsurance instrument.19 Furthermore, the accident-year loss ratio is applied in 
the study instead of the calendar year loss ratio for the reason that the accident-year 
loss ratio contains the information about losses and premiums of the policies that 
occur in that year. The calendar year loss ratio, in contrast, is based on an accounting 
perspective. Not only does it reflect information about the contracts that are written in 
a calendar year, the calendar year loss ratio also contains information about activities 
of the policies that were written in previous years.  For example, the loss ratio in 
calendar year 2000 includes the information of accident years 1991-2000 that could 
have transactions going on in year 2000. Selecting accident year in lieu of calendar 
                                                 
19 The analysis of correlation applying direct loss ratio and net loss ratio provides the similar results in 
term of both signs and magnitudes of the correlations.  
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year eliminates the information from the previous accident years that could mislead 
our analysis. 
  Furthermore, the reserving risk is evaluated by accident-year loss reserve 
development which is defined as: 
LossIncurredUltimate
LossIncurredInitialLossIncurredUltimatetdevelopmenLoss −= . 
We also define the one-calendar year loss development which will be used in 
our study. The one-calendar year loss development represents the total loss reserve 
adjustment accounted for in a given accident year. In order to standardize the loss 
development, we define the calendar year loss development as the loss adjustments 
occurred in a given accident year as percentage of earned premium of the policies 
written in the same year.  
premiumEarned
yearaccidentgivenaintdevelopmenlossyearOnetdevelopmenLossCYOne =
 
6.2. Vector-Autoregression (VAR) Analysis of Pricing and Reserving  
The robustness test of interactions between pricing and reserving risks will be 
performed via the so-called vector autoregression (VAR) methodology. The VAR 
technique allows us to examine the dynamic interactions between insurance price 
(loss ratio) and loss development. Though it does not imply any causal conclusion 
about insurance price and loss development patterns, it does allow us to observe the 
correlation between the two series in the current period when the time series effects 
are eliminated. 
 For a given line of business, we conduct the VAR analysis using panel data 
and follow the steps employed by McCarty and Schmidt (1997). Assume an 
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autoregressive lag length p, and estimate the following equations by ordinary least 
squares (OLS):  
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where 
 Lt   =    Loss ratio of accident year t  
 Rt   =    Loss development of accident year t  
      =  
LossIncurredUltimate
LossIncurredInitialLossIncurredUltimate −  
and c1, c2 are constant terms; α, β, γ, and ω are coefficient terms. 
However, while the parameters of the VAR show the effects of past loss 
development (loss ratio) on present loss ratio (loss development), they do not show 
the effects of an increase in current loss ratio on current loss development and vice 
versa. In order to delve within the current period for the correlation, we look at the 
correlation matrix of the error terms vector. If the error terms are positively 
correlated, then both variables tend to move together; if negatively correlated, those 
two variables tend to move in the opposite directions. If the correlation is zero, then 
the two variables are not related. The positive correlation would be consistent with the 
hypothesis about correlation between pricing risk and reserving risk, that is, increases 
(decreases) in price raise (reduce) the loss reserve.  
Not only can the VAR technique test for the correlation between loss ratio and 
loss development in the current period, this technique can control for economic 
drivers that could have a significant effect on the two time series. In our analysis, we 
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control for size of company (premium earned), interest rates (market yield on U.S. 
Treasury securities at 5-year constant maturity, quoted on investment basis), premium 
growth (percentage of increase in direct premium written), and percentage of 
premium written in commercial lines.  
6.3. Greatest Accuracy Credibility Theory 
Credibility theory (Whitney, 1918) is the branch of insurance mathematics that 
explores the experience rating formula based on weighted averages of both individual 
and segment estimates of the individual risk premium. The theory has been developed 
and applied in wide-ranging independent topics beyond the branch of risk theory.  
The classical credibility theory is a weighted average of the form 
μ)1(ˆ zmzm −+= ,                                       (6.1) 
where 10 ≤≤ z ; m = credibility estimate; mˆ = base statistic (or natural estimator 
based on individual data); μ = complement of credibility (or other information); z is 
the credibility associated with the base statistic.  
A variety of arguments have been used for developing the value of z. One of 
the most important is the Greatest Accuracy Credibility Theory. The objective of this 
theory is to estimate )(θm  with some function )(Xm(  of the individual data. In 
insurance mathematics, the Greatest Accuracy Credibility’s goal is to find the best 
estimator of the linear form  
bmam += ˆ( , 
where mˆ  is some estimator based on the individual data, and a and b are constants. 
The best estimator is determined by minimizing the mean squared error (MSE) 
](X))m-)([( 2(θmE .   
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The greatest accuracy break-through was introduced by Bühlmann (1967, 1969). 
Bühlmann credibility minimizes the square of the errors between the estimate and the 
true expected value of the quantity being estimated. This model considers a non-
parametric model specifying that, conditional on a set of parameters, Θ , the random 
variables X1,…, Xn have the same mean, )(θμ , and variance, )(θv , and are 
independent and identically distributed.  
Define  
)|()( θθ =Θ= jXEm  
and     ).|()( θθ =Θ= jXVarv  
where )(θm  is referred to as the hypothetical mean and )(θv is referred to as the 
process variance. Substituting 
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which is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of )(θm , Bühlmann derived the 
credibility formula as follows: 
μ)1( zXzm −+= ,                               (6.2) 
where     )( jXE=μ , 
kn
nz += ,       (6.3) 
and    
][
]Pr[
MeansalHypotheticVar
VarianceocessEk = .    
The credibility factor z is referred to as the Bühlmann credibility factor. The 
Expected Value of the Process Variance and the Variance of the Hypothetical Means 
are each calculated for a single observation of the risk process. 
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6.3.1. Bühlmann-Straub Model 
The Bühlmann model in the previous section is based on assumption that the 
random variables X1,…, Xn are independent and identically distributed. and do not 
allow for variations in exposure or size. Bühlmann and Straub (1970) extended the 
Bühlmann model by relaxing the i.i.d.  assumption and letting the conditional 
variance take the form: 
j
j p
vXVar )()|( θθ ==Θ ,  j=1,…,n 
where pj is the amount of risk exposed.  
The motivation was that Xj is the loss ratio in year j, which is the total claim 
amount divided by the amount of risk exposed. In our study, we define the loss ratio, 
Xj, as the ratio of accident-year incurred losses and loss expenses to earned premiums 
and define pj as the earned premiums. 
Applying algebraic work, Bühlmann and Straub derived the credibility 
formula which has the form as in (5.1) with   
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6.3.2. Error in Credibility Estimates 
Like other statistical models, the credibility model may possess prediction 
errors. (The prediction error is the squared difference between the credibility weighted 
prediction and the actual results.) The error of the predictor may arise from the 
process error and the bias of the complement. If the complement of the credibility is 
accurate in its own right, the resulting estimate will be more accurate. Therefore, the 
choice of complement is crucial for accuracy of prediction. 
The mean squared error (MSE) of the greatest accuracy credibility estimator is 
a function of the constants a and b. Applying this, one arrives at the optimal estimator 
which is known as linear Bayes (LB) estimator 
))ˆ(ˆ(
)ˆ(
)ˆ,())(( mEm
mVar
mmCovmEm −×+Θ= . 
To measure the accuracy of the LB estimator, the MSE which is known as LB 
risk is derived and is expressed in the explicit formula as 
    
)ˆ(
)ˆ,()(
2
mVar
mmCovmVar −=ρ , 
where m is the actual value of observation. 
The LB risk for the Bühlmann model and Bühlmann-Straub model have the 
same form of 
))(()1( Θ−= mVarzρ , 
where z is as defined in (6.3) and (6.4) respectively. 
We apply the credibility theory in quantifying the homogeneity of the 
underwriting risks within market segments. The Bühlmann-Straub model is selected 
as a methodology for explaining the choice complements of credibility and comparing 
the effectiveness of the various models due to its capability to reflect variations in 
exposure or size. In particular, we investigate the accuracy of loss ratio and loss 
 76
development credibility estimation using the industry and market segments as choices 
of complement of credibility.  
Since we have the data available for year 1991-2004, we apply the data up to 
year 2003 in estimating the credibility parameters and predicting the risk of year 
2004. The estimates of the risk will then be compared with the actual data in 2004. 
The error from the estimation is the difference between the credibility estimates and 
the actual risk in year 2004. The mean of squared error is regarded as a measure of the 
accuracy of model predictions. To support our hypotheses, the credibility model that 
uses segment-specific risk as complements of credibility must give a better prediction 
relative to the model that uses the industry-wide risk.  
Two Bühlmann-Straub models will be exercised for this analysis. Everything 
else is the same; the first model uses the industry loss ratio as the complement of 
credibility while the second model employs the market segment loss ratio as the 
choice of complement of credibility. The credibility estimates derived from the first 
model, for which we will refer to as the “industry model” hereafter, are based on the 
assumption that the risk is a combination of the company-specific risk and the 
industry-wide risk. On the other hand, the second model presents the idea that the risk 
is dependent upon the company-specific risk and the segment-specific risk. The 
explicit forms of the two models can be shown as follows. 
Model 1:  1)1(ˆ μzmzm −+=  
Model 2:  2)1(ˆ μzmzm −+=  
where 1μ  is the industry-wide risk and 2μ is the segment-specific risk.  
Comparing the accuracy of the credibility estimates between the two models 
will provide evidence about the homogeneity of risk in the industry and the market 
segment. If the risk is more homogenous within market segments than within the 
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whole industry, the mean squared errors derived from the second model should be less 
than that derived from the first model.  
According to our study, we will perform the analysis in both pricing risk and 
reserving risk. In the pricing risk framework, we define the variables in the equations 
as follows. 
jyearinratiolossIndustry
jyearinratiolossCompanyX j =  
11 == jyearinratiolossIndustry
jyearinratiolossIndustryμ  
jyearinratiolossIndustry
jyearinratiolosssegmentMarket=2μ  
=jp Earned Premium in year j  
 In the credibility analysis for reserving risk, we apply loss reserve 
development, which is defined by the ratio of the adverse loss development to the 
ultimate incurred losses, as a proxy for reserving risk. The variables in the credibility 
model for reserving risk are defined as follows. 
jyearintdevelopmenlossIndustry
jyearintdevelopmenlossCompanym j =  
11 == jyearintdevelopmenlossIndustry
jyearintdevelopmenlossIndustryμ  
jyearintdevelopmenlossIndustry
jyearintdevelopmenlosssegmentMarket=2μ  
=jp  Premium in year j  
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The errors of credibility estimations will be calculated, and the results will 
imply the justification of our hypothesis that the underwriting risks are more uniform 
within market segments than within the overall market. 
6.4. Actuarial Reserving Model 
We employ the Incurred Chain-Ladder reserving method for examining the 
actuarial model risks. The Chain-Ladder method is a widely used method for loss 
reserve estimation (Radtke and Schmidt, 2004). The method uses historical 
cumulative incurred losses by accident year and develops those actual losses to 
estimate ultimate losses based upon the assumption that the actual losses will develop 
to estimated ultimate cost in a manner that is analogous to those in the prior years. 
This method is selected for our analysis due to its simplicity and its popular usage in 
loss development estimations. 
Consider the loss development triangle from Schedule P, part 2 in an annual 
statement (see Table 1). Let { } { }nkikiS ,...,1,0,, ∈  be a family of incurred loss random 
variables. We interpret Si,k as the incurred losses of accident year i and development 
year k. Si,k is observable for calendar year nki ≤+  and unknown for calendar year 
nki >+ . According to Schedule P part 2, we have n = 10. 
For { }ni ,...,1,0∈ and { }nk ,...,1,0∈ , define the individual development factor of 
accident year i and development year k: 
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where CLkF and 
CL
kiS , are called the chain-ladder factor of development year k and the 
chain-ladder predictor of the aggregate incurred loss kiS , for accident year i and 
development year k, respectively.  
The actuarial reserve errors are calculated for each individual insurer. The 
Chain-Ladder estimate error is defined as: 
emiumEarned
LossIncurredLadderChainUltimateofasLossIncurrederrorreserveLadderChain
Pr
)2004( −=
 
6.5. Proposed Measure to Diversification Benefit 
This study offers a method for evaluating the product diversification benefit 
for pricing risk and reserving risk. Instead of merely using the historical years, our 
approach instills the predictive assessment for diversification benefit. The accident-
year net earned premium and net incurred losses are employed in the calculation in 
accordance with the net premium written that is used in BCAR model. In addition, we 
include eight major lines of business in the measurement to avoid the unremitting data 
in some minor lines. The lines of business included in the measurement are workers’ 
compensation, other liability, commercial multiple peril, commercial auto liability, 
private passenger auto liability, medical malpractice, product liability, and 
homeowner insurance. Given that the premium volume in the lines that are excluded 
is quite small, we hope that dropping these lines will not considerably affect the 
measurement.  
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6.5.1. Diversification Benefit on the Underwriting Losses 
In calculating the diversification benefit, we assume the latest year earned 
premium as the premium to be earned in the upcoming years. The loss ratio patterns 
are assumed to be approximately analogous to those in the historical years. For each 
line of business, the projected future losses are estimated from the latest-year earned 
premium and the loss ratios in the historical years. In particular, the projected losses 
are equal to the latest-year premium multiplied by the historical loss ratios. The 
standard deviation of the projected losses is then calculated for each individual line. 
The standard deviations from individual lines are thus added up as if the losses of 
each line of business are independent. To calculate the diversification benefit, we 
apply the same steps of calculation in the portfolio level. For each company, we 
aggregate the latest-year earned premium and incurred losses in every line of business 
and exploit them in the loss projection. Then the diversification benefit is defined by 
the difference between the standard deviation of the aggregate projected loss and the 
summation of the standard deviation of individual lines. The explicit form of 
diversification benefit can be written as: 
∑
−=
i
ilineinlossprojected
lossprojectedAggregatebenefitationDiversific
σ
σ
1 . 
An insurer who writes business in only one line of business will have zero 
diversification benefit, according to the formula.   
6.5.2. Diversification Benefit on Loss Development 
In addition to the analysis of diversification benefit on the underwriting losses, 
we are interested in investigating whether such benefit also has positive effect on the 
reserving risk. Indeed, we expect to see the lower risk of the loss development in the 
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multiple-line insurers relative to the single-line insurers. Analogous to the incurred 
loss projection, we assume the latest-year ultimate incurred loss as of year 2004 as the 
ultimate incurred loss to be observed in the forthcoming years. The ultimate loss 
development pattern, which is defined by the ultimate incurred loss minus the initial 
incurred loss, is postulated to be similar to those in the historical years.  
For each line of business, the projected future initial incurred losses are 
estimated based on the above assumptions. The projection of the amount of the 
adverse/favorable loss development is then derived from the difference between the 
latest year ultimate incurred loss and the projected initial incurred loss. Similar to the 
steps for evaluating the diversification benefit on the incurred loss, the standard 
deviations of the projected loss development are calculated for each line of business 
and are summed up as if they were independent to each other. The diversification 
benefit is defined as the difference between the standard deviation of the aggregate 
projected loss development and the standard deviation of the summation of the 
projected loss development.  
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According to the formula, the single-line insurers will gain zero diversification benefit 
on loss development.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7. Empirical Results 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the loss ratios of each line by year for 
the years 1991-2004. The mean of loss ratios suggest a tendency of changes in prices 
from year to year. The patterns of loss ratios tend to be unique for each line of 
business. In general, the price patterns in long-tailed liability lines such as workers’ 
compensation are gradually changed, i.e., the loss ratios increase and decrease in a 
slow manner. Prices in homeowners, however, tend to move up and down more 
frequently than the prices in liability lines. This could be because prices in 
homeowners tend to adjust quickly in response to the natural catastrophe events. 
In the following subsections, we analyze the empirical results of pricing and 
reserving risks and their interactions. The plan of the analysis is as follows. Section 
7.1 discusses the findings of relationships between pricing risk and reserving risk. 
Section 7.2 presents the credibility estimations of pricing and reserving risk and their 
implication regarding the homogeneity of underwriting risks within the insurer 
categories. Section 7.3 discusses the reserve errors that are generated by the Chain-
Ladder reserving method. Based on our proposed methods, section 7.4 analyzes the 
results of product diversification benefit on the incurred losses and on the loss 
development. 
7.1. Correlation Analysis of Pricing Risk and Reserving Risk 
The objective of this analysis is to test the hypotheses that pricing and 
reserving risks are correlated and that the correlations vary by firm categories, i.e., 
firm size, organization structure, product diversification, and geographic 
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diversification. The relationships are measured in three different ways: (i) the 
correlations between accident-year loss ratios and accident-year loss development, (ii) 
the correlations between accident-year net loss ratios and one-calendar-year loss 
development, and (iii) the correlations between changes in accident-year net loss ratio 
and one-calendar-year loss development.  The correlations between accident-year loss 
ratios and accident-year loss development provide insight of whether the risk of 
underestimating (overestimating) reserves for unpaid losses is associated with the risk 
of under-pricing (over-pricing). The correlations between accident-year net loss ratios 
and one-calendar-year loss development determine whether the insurers tend to adjust 
the loss reserves in relation to the current price levels. The correlations between 
changes in accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development 
measure the concurrency of the timing of price changes and loss reserve adjustments. 
Furthermore, we categorize the insurers by four characteristics, i.e., firm size, 
firm structure, product diversification, and geographic diversification. We expect that 
the relationships of pricing and reserving risks are different according to different risk 
characteristics in each category. 
The plan of this section is as follows. Section 7.1.1 discusses the findings of 
the relationships between pricing risk and reserving risk using the industry aggregate 
data.  Section 7.1.2 examines the relationships between pricing risk and reserving risk 
based on the mean correlations derived from the company data. Sections 7.1.3-7.1.6 
present the price-reserve correlations in relation to firm size, firm structure, product 
diversification, and geographic diversification respectively. 
7.1.1. Correlation analysis of industry aggregate pricing and reserving risks  
In this subsection, we discuss the industry aggregate relationships of pricing 
and reserving risks. We observe the patterns of pricing risk and reserving risk which 
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are shown by the plots of (i) accident-year loss ratios against the accident year loss 
development, (ii) accident-year net loss ratios against the one-calendar year loss 
development, and (iii) change in net loss ratios against the one-calendar year loss 
development. Note that the definitions of the variables are provided in section 6.1. 
According to the industry aggregate plots of accident-year loss ratios against 
accident-year loss development for the eight selected lines of business (see figure 
1.1a-1.8a), we see that both series tend to follow the same pattern. The patterns of 
accident-year loss ratio and accident-year loss development have almost the same 
shape in workers’ compensation, other liability, commercial auto liability, and 
product liability industry. The similar patterns of the two series are also presented in 
private passenger auto liability, commercial and multiple peril, and medical 
malpractice industry. Homeowners industry, however, does not show this tendency. 
The accident-year loss development is very small in this line because claims are 
usually settled within one or two years. The prices, on the other hand, are more 
volatile as the losses in homeowners are driven by natural catastrophe events. 
Focusing on liability lines of business, we measure the relationship between 
accident-year industry loss ratios and loss development through their correlations. 
Since the pricing and reserving cycles seem to be unique for each line of business, we 
investigate the correlations between accident-year loss ratios and loss development 
separately by lines of business. Even though homeowners insurance does not display 
a cyclical pattern of loss development, we include this line in our study as an example 
of property line of business and as a benchmark for the analysis in the other selected 
lines.  
Table 3 shows the correlations between the accident-year aggregate loss ratio 
(direct and reinsurance assumed) and accident-year loss development in the eight 
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major lines of business. The results suggest that the two variables are positively 
correlated with a higher magnitude in the liability lines than in the property lines such 
as homeowners. This is not surprising because liability lines have a long tail, and their 
losses are more difficult to initially estimate in the early years of the loss development 
process. The difficulty in accurately estimating insured losses affects both pricing risk 
and reserving risk, and their interaction. 
Lines of insurance differ in terms of how quickly claims are settled and losses 
are paid. This affects how quickly insurers can develop accurate estimates of the 
losses they will ultimately have to pay. Lines with longer loss developments periods 
or that are subject to factors that can significantly change the losses that insurers will 
be required to pay would be expected to be more prone to loss reserving errors. 
 Following this reasoning, we can see that the correlations between loss rations 
and loss development are weaker in commercial multiple peril (CMP) and private 
passenger auto liability (PPAL). The weaker correlation observed in private passenger 
auto liability may be due to the fact that PPAL losses tend to be more stable and less 
subject to reserve and pricing errors. The correlation in CMP, which includes both 
liability and property coverages, may be weakened by its property coverage 
component for which losses are paid more quickly than for liability coverages. 
For a short-tailed property line such as homeowners insurance, we also see 
that price-reserve correlation is low and not statistically significant. Homeowners 
claims are paid relatively quickly but this line is subject to loss shocks arising from 
weather-related perils and natural disasters. Hence, homeowners loss ratios can be 
relatively volatile from year to year but this volatility is due to highly variable losses 
rather than errors in estimating reserves for unpaid claims. 
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Next, we analyze whether the loss reserve adjustments is related to the price 
level at an industry aggregate level. In other words, we explore the correlations 
between industry accident-year net loss ratio and industry one-calendar-year net 
losses and loss expenses development (see the definition in section 6.1). Note that the 
accident-year net loss ratio and net one-calendar-year loss development are chosen for 
the analysis instead of the direct and assumed loss ratio and loss development due to 
the data availability. Hence, the result we obtain from the correlation analysis is after 
the effect from the reinsurance management. 
Figures 1.1a-1.8a illustrate the industry aggregate plots of accident-year net 
loss ratios against one-calendar-year loss development for the eight selected lines of 
business. However, the figures do not graphically show a high correlation between the 
two series.  In product liability industry, the one-calendar year loss development is 
very volatile and it appears to be independent of the net loss ratio. The one-calendar 
year loss development in homeowners market, however, is almost flat and tends to be 
unrelated with the net loss ratios. The smooth pattern of one-calendar year loss 
development in homeowners could be because claims are settled and losses are paid 
quickly. 
In order to measure the relationship between prices and loss reserve 
adjustments in a given year, we examine the industry aggregate correlations between 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development as shown in table 
4. Interestingly, the correlations are low in most of the lines with exception of 
commercial multiple peril and other liability. In addition, the signs of correlations 
vary by lines of business. The industry aggregate data shows the negative correlations 
in the industry of commercial multiple peril, other liability, workers’ compensation, 
and product liability. The positive correlations observed in the industry of commercial 
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auto liability, medical malpractice, and private passenger auto liability reject our 
hypothesis that the adverse loss reserve adjustments tend to occur when prices are 
high. However, it offers new insight that calendar year loss development behaves very 
differently from the accident-year loss development. Furthermore, it supports 
indirectly the notion that insurers can manipulate their booked reserves in the timing 
of recognition of accident-year profits/losses (knowingly or unknowingly) by bowing 
to other pressures. 
Even though we do not find consistent evidence of the relationship of prices 
and one-calendar year loss development among lines of business, we speculate that 
the calendar year loss reserve development can be more related to the change in price 
rather than the price level per se.  
We investigate the coincidence of the timing of price changes and loss reserve 
adjustments. Figures 1.1b-1.8b illustrate the industry aggregate plots of change in 
accident-year net loss ratios against one-calendar-year loss development for the eight 
selected lines of business. The plots indicate that, at an industry aggregate level, the 
change in accident-year net loss ratios tend to be negatively correlated with the one-
calendar year loss development in workers’ compensation, other liability, commercial 
auto liability, and medical malpractice. The negative correlations imply that insurers 
are likely to adjust the loss reserves and change the prices at the same time. In 
contrast, the accident-year net loss ratios and one-calendar year loss development do 
not track in commercial multiple peril, private passenger auto liability, product 
liability, and homeowners. The stable one-calendar year loss development in 
commercial multiple peril and homeowners could be due to the property coverage 
component in which claims are settled quickly. In product liability industry, the one-
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calendar year loss development is very volatile compared with the change in net loss 
ratio.  
Table 5 exhibits the correlations between change in price and one-calendar-
year loss development using the industry aggregate data. Consistent with our 
expectation, changes in accident-year loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss 
development are negatively related in all of the selected lines. In addition, they are 
highly correlated in commercial auto liability, other liability, medical malpractice, and 
workers’ compensation, yet they are not strongly correlated in commercial multiple 
peril, private passenger auto liability, product liability, and homeowners.  
Nonetheless, the correlation analysis using the industry aggregate data may 
show misleading results as it merely offers the sketch of the interaction between 
pricing and reserving risks. For more concrete evidence, we extend the investigation 
the interactions between pricing and reserving risks by analyzing individual company 
data as will be discussed in the section 7.1.2. 
7.1.2. Correlation analysis of pricing and reserving risks based on the company 
data 
For the analysis of the relationship between pricing and reserving risks based 
on the company data, the correlations between the two risks are calculated for each 
company, and the means of the correlations are used in analyzing the results. 
Per tables 3.1-3.8, the results indicate that the correlations between accident-
year loss ratios and loss development are positive and significantly different from zero 
in every selected line of business, affirming the interaction between pricing risk and 
reserving risk; this is especially true in commercial lines such as workers’ 
compensation, other liability, and medical malpractice.  The results imply that the 
under (over) pricing leads to the under (over) reserving and vice versa. Yet, the usage 
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of company data in the analysis yields the lower correlations relative to the usage of 
aggregate level data.20 
Furthermore, we expect that the accident-year net loss ratios and one-calendar-
year loss development will show the negative correlations, based on the reasons that 
the over-reserves from prior high rate years may be used in low rate years to subsidize 
underwriting results. Hence, we expect to observe the low prices in the years that 
there are releases of loss reserves. Similarly, we hypothesize that, in the high rate 
years, the insurers can afford to correct the loss reserves. The funds obtained from 
high prices can be used to correct the reserves that were underestimated in the past 
years. Thus high prices can lead to an increase in reserves.  
Tables 4.1-4.8 illustrate the correlations between accident-year loss ratios and 
one-calendar year loss development by lines of business. The mean and median of the 
correlation are close to zero in all lines of business. In contrast to what we find in the 
other liability aggregate data, the correlation between the two series derived from the 
company data is also close to zero. The signs of the correlations, however, are 
different among lines of business, providing no clear relationship of prices and loss 
reserve adjustments.  
We can offer behavioral explanations for the observations of low or positive 
correlations between calendar year loss development and accident-year loss ratios. 
The pricing and loss reserve adjustment decisions can be influenced by the current 
surplus amount which could be funded from external sources. An insurer may choose 
to correct its previous underestimated reserves and charge the low prices when it has 
enough funds to do so. On the other hand, prices and reserve account may be used as 
                                                 
20 The lower correlations observed in the correlation analysis that is based on the company data could 
come from the reason that, in comparison to the company loss ratios and company loss development, 
the industry loss ratios and industry loss development tend to be more stable. The more variability in 
the company loss ratios and loss developments could affect the correlation analysis in the way that it 
weakens the observed correlations between the two variables. 
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a source of funds when the insurer is short of surplus. As a result, the price and loss 
reserve may increase at the same time.  
Next, we examine the correlations between change in accident-year net loss 
ratio and accident-year loss development using the company data. Since increase 
(decrease) in loss reserves reduce (increase) the surplus amount which can lead to 
increase (decrease) in the insurance prices. Also, when prices increase, the insurers 
gain fund and may use this fund to revise the reserves account. Therefore, we expect 
to observe lower (higher) prices together with the favorable (adverse) loss reserve 
adjustments. This insight leads us to the following investigation of the impact of 
calendar year loss development on the changes of accident-year loss ratio. 
We observe the correlations between changes in accident-year net loss ratio 
from the prior year and one-calendar-year loss development using the company data. 
Consistent with our expectations, the change in accident-year net loss ratio and one-
calendar-year loss development are negatively correlated in all of the selected lines 
(see tables 5.1-5.8). However, the degrees of the correlations are much lower when 
the company data is used instead of the aggregate data.21  
Comparing the results of the three different correlations, we see that they are 
not similar. This is not surprising since the three correlations have different meanings 
(the implications of the three correlations are provided at the beginning of section 
7.1). For instance, the correlations between change in net loss ratio and one-calendar-
year loss development (table 5.1-5.8) test the timing of changes in prices and reserve 
                                                 
21 The considerable differences in the magnitudes of the correlations derived from the industry 
aggregate and company data could be due to the definitions of the one-calendar-year loss development 
(see section 6.1). According to the definition of one-calendar-year loss development, the loss 
development is weighted by the earned premium. Since the industry earned premiums are huge relative 
to the amount of calendar year loss development, the “one-calendar-year loss development” is 
substantially compressed. The noises created by the company data is also offset when the industry 
aggregate data is used. On the other hand, the difference between company earn premium and calendar 
year loss development is smaller than that of the industry level. Therefore, the “one-calendar-year loss 
development” is not materially compressed.  The “one-calendar-year loss development” also contains 
noises when the company data is used in the analysis. 
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adjustments while the correlations between accident-year loss ratio and one-calendar-
year loss development (table 3.1-3.8) do not consider the time scale effect.  
One might argue that one year may be too short to observe the correlations 
between pricing risk and reserving risk. The underlying reasoning is that there is a 
time lag between loss reserve adjustments and the shifts of underwriting policy. In the 
period of softening market, insurers’ change of underwriting policy is a more gradual 
event. Particularly in large companies, it can take 12 months for insurers to really 
begin to shift underwriting policy after the release/accrual of reserves in the previous 
year. However, the shift in underwriting policy can occur more rapidly in hardening 
market since often the insurers respond to a clear event (e.g. loss shock). 
Consequently, the inter-period interactions between pricing risk and reserving risk 
may exist. In addition to the investigation of pricing risk and reserving risk in the one-
period framework, we explore the relationships of the previous year reserving risk and 
the current year pricing risk. We rationalize that the release (accrual) of loss reserves 
in the previous year can lead to the decrease (increase) in price in the current year.  
The results of interactions between accident-year net loss ratio and one-year 
lag of the one-calendar-year loss development reject our expectation that the pricing 
risk and reserving risk are well correlated in the two-year timeframe. In fact, the 
correlations are low and indeed close to zero. We also calculate the correlations 
between one-year lag of net loss ratio and one-calendar year loss development but the 
correlation is also very minuscule. For example, in other liability industry, the average 
of correlations between change in net loss ratio and one-year lag of one-calendar year 
loss development is 0.1%, and the average of correlations between one-year lag of 
change in net loss ratio and one-calendar year loss development is only 1.2%.  
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7.1.3. Correlation analysis of pricing risk and reserving risk with respect to the 
firm size 
This section tests hypotheses about the relationships between pricing risk and 
reserving risk whether it is different by sizes of insurers. We examine how the price-
reserve correlations vary by insurer size (as shown in Tables 3.1-3.8). Since large 
insurance companies tend to write broader and more diverse market segments and set 
prices using experience ratings, we expect that they will show a positive and strong 
correlation between pricing and reserving risks. The reasoning underlying this 
expectation is that insurers with larger and more diverse books of business will be less 
informed about factors or developments that will affect the ultimate incurred losses 
for different market segments within their portfolios of exposures. This, in turn, may 
lead to pricing errors that are linked to errors in estimating unpaid losses. Small local 
insurers, on the other hand, are not experience rating. They tend to write narrower 
market segments, which gives them an informational advantage in accurately 
estimating reserves and setting prices. Therefore we expect the small insurers to have 
a weaker correlation between pricing and reserving risks.  
Table 3 shows the correlations, at an aggregate level, between accident-year 
loss ratios and accident-year loss development for small, midsize, large, and giant 
insurers for the eight selected lines of business (see section 6.1. for the definitions of 
sizes of insurers). Consistent with our expectations, small companies, in general, 
exhibit low correlations in comparison to large and giant insurers.  
CMP and WC are two lines where we do not see this tendency. Large and 
giant companies do not have a significant correlation in commercial multiple peril. In 
WC, the correlation is not substantially different among the different insurer size 
categories. It could be that regulation in this line has a similar impact on every insurer 
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and this leads to less variation in their correlations between loss ratios and loss 
development. 
 For the other liability lines, the correlation analysis suggests that accident-
year loss ratios and ultimate loss development are generally correlated and their 
relationship differs by insurer size.  
We extend the investigation of correlations between pricing risk and reserving 
risk by analyzing individual company data. Tables 3.1-3.8 illustrate the correlations 
between accident-year loss ratios and accident-year loss development. The results 
support our hypothesis that the magnitudes of the correlations vary by size of 
companies. In every selected liability lines, we find that large and giant insurance 
companies have higher correlations in comparison to that of the small insurers. The 
implication of this result is that the less information about losses and the usage of 
experience rating in large companies strengthen the interaction between pricing and 
reserving errors. However, homeowners and private passenger auto liability insurers 
do not show that the correlations are considerably different among the different sizes 
of companies. An explanation of this result is that the loss development is small for 
every size of homeowners writers due to the quick claim settlement and loss payment. 
In private passenger auto liability, the losses tend to be well understood and both 
small and large insurers are less subject to the pricing and reserving errors. 
Next, we explore the interactions between loss reserve adjustments in a given 
year and the same year prices. In contrast to the findings in the analysis of accident-
year loss ratios and ultimate loss development, the industry aggregate data shows that 
small companies have higher correlations between changes in accident-year loss ratio 
and one-calendar year loss development in commercial multiple peril, other liability, 
product liability and homeowners (see table 5). Moreover, the small companies in 
 94
product liability have positive correlation. The midsize companies, on the other hand, 
have stronger correlation than the other sizes in medical malpractice and workers’ 
compensation. Only commercial auto liability shows that large insurers have the 
larger magnitude of the correlation than the smaller sizes of insurers.  
We further observe the correlations between changes in loss ratio from the 
prior year and one-calendar year loss development by analyzing the company data. 
Tables 5.1-5.8 present the negative correlations in most of lines of business. In 
contrast to the results derived from the industry aggregate data, small companies in 
product liability have a negative correlation, but not significantly different from zero, 
between changes in accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss 
development. The homeowner insurers, however, do not show that the correlations 
vary by sizes of the companies.  
With the exception of the commercial multiple peril, the results based on the 
company data suggest that large and giant companies display a stronger correlation in 
comparison to the smaller insurers, implying that large and giant companies tend to 
increase their loss reserves while raising the prices. In commercial multiple peril, the 
midsize companies have the greatest correlation. 
These findings suggest that the correlations between change in accident-year 
loss ratio and calendar-year loss development vary by line of business and company’s 
characteristics. Nevertheless, the insurers with any company’s characteristics tend to 
increase (decrease) price while accruing (releasing) the reserves, which is consistent 
with our hypothesis. 
7.1.4. Correlation analysis of pricing risk and reserving risk with respect to the 
firm structure 
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The relationships between pricing risk and reserving risk are also expected to 
be related to insurer’s incentives with respect to organization structure. In particular, 
we expect that the stock and publicly traded stock insurers will display a higher 
correlation between pricing risk and reserving risk than the other types of companies. 
We leave the alien insurers out from the discussion as they may experience the non-
domestic influences. We also do not discuss the results from the types with few 
companies because the results could be misleading.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, tables 3.1-3.8 exhibits higher correlations 
between accident-year loss ratios and accident-year loss development in the publicly 
traded stock insurers and/or stock insurers in most of the selected lines. Disregarding 
the alien insurers who tend to have special behaviors in accordance with the 
influences from their parent companies, the publicly traded insurers and/or stock 
insurers have higher correlations than the other types of companies in every line of 
business. The result in medical malpractice and product liability, in contrast, suggests 
that mutual insurers and stock insurers have roughly the same correlations (within 
reasonable range of sampling error). Note that per tables 3.1-3.8 the order of 
correlations of risk retention group, reciprocal, and alien companies are not consistent 
among lines of business. An explanation for the arbitrariness could be the limited 
number of samples in these types of insurers. Another explanation might be that these 
insurers have other characteristics and behaviors that are not fully captured by our 
classification by size and type of insurer, and those insurers may employ different 
strategies for different lines of business. In summary, the results indicate that stock 
insurers, especially publicly traded companies, have stronger correlations between 
accident-year loss ratios and accident-year loss development than the other types in 
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most of the lines of business, implying that the earning pressure in the stock insurers 
fortify the correlations between pricing risk and reserving risk.  
Exploring the interactions between changes in price and loss reserve 
adjustments with respect to the firm structure, we find that stock insurers show a 
significant and strong interactions between change in price and loss reserve 
adjustment in other liability and commercial multiple peril. That is, the increase in 
accident-year loss ratio is likely to be observed with the increase in one-calendar-year 
loss development in these lines of product. Mutual insurers, nevertheless, have the 
strongest correlations in workers’ compensation, private passenger auto liability, 
commercial auto liability, medical malpractice, product liability, and homeowners 
market. The results do not show clear evidence that the timings of loss reserve 
adjustment and the shift of underwriting policy vary according to the firm structure. 
7.1.5. Correlation analysis of pricing risk and reserving risk with respect to 
product diversification 
Product diversification is another factor we expect to have influence on the 
relationships between pricing and reserving risks. The insurers who write business in 
one or a few lines are likely to have more specialist expertise for the business they are 
doing. The contrary goes for the multiple-line insurers. In comparison to the single-
line or few-line insurers, the insurers who write business in several lines tend to be 
more subject to pricing and reserving errors due to the less knowledge about the risks 
of the coverages. Consequently, we hypothesize that the correlations between pricing 
risk and reserving risk are greater in multiple-line insurers.  
Tables 3.1-3.8 demonstrate the correlations between pricing risk (accident-
year loss ratios) and reserving risk (accident-year loss development) according to 
product diversification, which is presented by number of lines written. The multi-line 
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writers tend to exhibit higher correlations between accident-year loss ratio and the 
accident-year loss development in commercial casualty lines such as commercial auto 
liability, workers compensation, and product liability. However, we do not see this 
tendency in the other lines of business. Therefore, the results suggest that the price-
reserve correlations are not subject to the number of lines written. 
Next, we analyze the interactions between changes in price and loss reserve 
adjustments with respect to the number of lines written. Per tables 5.1-5.8, we observe 
that the simultaneous occurrence of price increments (decrements) and one-calendar 
year adverse (favorable) loss development is more pronounced in multi-line insurers 
in commercial multiple peril, commercial auto liability, product liability and 
homeowners. In contrary, the correlations between change in net loss ratios and one-
calendar year loss development are higher in mono-line or few-line insurers than the 
multi-line insurers in workers’ compensation, private passenger auto liability, and 
medical malpractice. In other liability, the correlations are quite close among different 
classes of the number of lines. The different results among lines of business provide 
weak evidence that the interactions between changes in price and loss reserve 
adjustment vary by the number of lines of business. 
7.1.6. Correlation analysis of pricing risk and reserving risk with respect to 
geographic diversification 
Similar to the analysis of pricing risk and reserving risk associated with the 
number of lines of business, we speculate that the same rationality works for the 
geographic diversification. That is, the insurers who write business in one or a few 
states are likely to have more specialist expertise for the business they are doing. On 
the other hand, the insurers who write business in several states tend to be more 
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subject to pricing and reserving errors due to lack of the expertise. Hence, we 
hypothesize that the multiple-state insurers have the higher price-reserve correlations.  
The results in tables 3.1-3.8 suggest that the insurers who write in multiple  
states tend to have higher correlations between accident-year loss ratios and accident-
year loss development than the mono-state writers; this is true for commercial 
multiple liability, other liability, private passenger auto liability, workers 
compensation, and product liability. The commercial auto liability, medical 
malpractice and homeowners, however, do not have this tendency. Therefore, the 
results do not propose strong evidence that the pricing risk and reserving risk differ by 
geographic diversification. 
Considering the interactions between changes in price and loss reserve 
adjustments with respect to the number of states written (see tables 5.1-5.8), the 
results suggest that the companies who write business in single and/or a few states 
have stronger correlations between price changes and one-year loss development in 
medical malpractice, private passenger auto liability, workers’ compensation, and 
homeowners. On the other hand, the hypothesis is supported in other liability, 
commercial multiple peril, commercial auto liability, and product liability. The 
multiple-state insurers in these lines show the stronger correlations between changes 
in net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development. The different results among 
lines of business imply the influence of geographic diversification and expertise on 
the interactions between changes in price and the loss reserve adjustments are 
different by line of business. 
7.1.7. Vector Autoregression Analysis of Pricing Risk and Reserving Risk 
 As researchers have found evidence that insurance price in property/casualty 
industry is AR(2) and that some economic factors have influence on pricing risk, we 
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are interested in investigating the correlation pricing risk and reserving risk if the time 
series and some relevant economic factors that affect both pricing risk and reserving 
risk are controlled. We select lag two (p=2) in our VAR analysis corresponding to 
literatures and statistical concerns. 
The economic variables that are controlled in the VAR analysis are size of 
company (earned premium), interest rates (market yield on U.S. Treasury securities at 
5-year constant maturity, quoted on investment basis), premium growth (percentage 
of increase in direct premium written), and percentage of premium written in 
commercial lines. The percentage of premium written in commercial lines is included 
as the exogenous variable for the reason that these lines tend to be significantly 
subjected to market competition, and their prices are more volatile than personal lines.  
Due to the limited data, we do not run the VAR models separately by the 
insurers’ risk characteristics, e.g., firm size, firm structure, number of lines, and 
number of states. 
According to the reasons given in section 6.2, we focus on the correlations of 
the error terms derived from the VAR analysis. The positive correlations of the error 
terms means that, in a given year, the increases (decreases) in pricing risk raise 
(reduce) the loss reserving risk after time series effect are controlled.  
 Table 6 exhibits the residuals correlations derived from VAR analysis for 
eight selected lines of business. We perform the VAR analysis using three models.  
Model 1 studies the correlations between accident-year loss ratios and ultimate loss 
development. Model 2 studies the correlations between accident-year net loss ratio 
and one-calendar-year loss development. Model 3 studies the correlations between 
change in net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development. 
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The correlations of the residuals in model 1 have the sign that consistent with 
our hypothesis: accident-year loss ratios and ultimate loss development in a given 
year are positively correlated. In exception with commercial multiple peril and 
homeowners in model 1, the correlations between pricing risk and reserving risk are 
significantly different from zero, affirming that pricing risk and reserving risk are 
related. The insignificant correlations between accident-year loss ratio and accident-
year ultimate loss development in commercial multiple peril and homeowners could 
be due to that the pricing errors of the property coverages are more related to the 
natural losses rather than the reserving errors.  
It is not surprising that the correlations of accident-year loss ratio and 
accident-year ultimate loss development that are derived from the VAR model, in 
general, are lower than the simple correlations in tables 3.1-3.8. The lower 
correlations imply that the time series effect and the selected economic factors have 
an effect on price-reserve correlations.  
On the other hand, the correlations between prices and loss reserve 
adjustments in a given year are ambiguous once time series effect and some 
exogenous variables are taken care of. In particular, although they are all significantly 
different from zero, the correlations between accident-year net loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development and the correlations between change in net loss ratio 
from prior year and one-calendar year loss development have mixed signs among 
lines of business. That is, in a given year, it is not clear that how the accident-year net 
loss ratio and change in net loss ratio relates to one-year loss development after 
controlling for the effect from time series and some exogenous variables. 
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7.2. Credibility Theory and Analysis of Underwriting Risk 
A major hypothesis that is previously posed is that the underwriting risks to 
some extent are a consequence of the insurers’ behaviors and risk characteristics. 
However, the risk characteristics of the insurers can be practically homogeneous 
within the market segments, which is defined in term of firm size, firm structure, 
product diversification, and geographic diversification, rather than within the whole 
industry. Unfortunately, the current regulatory risk-based capital models for 
underwriting risks rely on company-specific risk and industry-wide risk. If the 
underwriting risk structure is more uniform within market segments than within the 
overall market, considering the refined segment in the regulatory models will improve 
the accuracy of the risk assessment.  
7.2.1. Segment Specificity of Pricing Risk 
Tables 7.1-7.8 illustrate the mean of squared errors and median of squared 
errors for the models with different choice of complements of credibility. The choices 
of complements of credibility are defined according to the definitions for market 
segmentation. More specifically, in each line of business, the market is segmented by 
size, type, number of lines, and number of states of the insurers. We will discuss the 
results from each model according to its choice of complement of credibility. 
First, we compare the accuracy of the credibility estimates of the model that 
use industry loss ratio as the complement of credibility with the models that utilize the 
loss ratio of each size segments. The mean squared errors in tables 7.1-7.8 imply that, 
having the industry model as a benchmark, the pricing risk appear to be size-specific 
for large and/or giant insurers in most of the lines of product such as commercial 
multiple peril, commercial auto liability, private passenger auto liability, workers’ 
compensation, product liability, and homeowners. Commercial multiple peril and 
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product liability also show that the pricing risk is analogous among small insurers. 
Furthermore, the results in medical malpractice and other liability market suggest that 
the pricing risk is more homogeneous within small and midsize insurers than within 
the overall industry. 
Next, we delve into the uniqueness of pricing risks within market segments by 
type of the company. Except for the other liability industry, publicly traded insurers 
show the type-specific pricing risk in every line of business. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the earning tension can bring about the special pricing risk for the 
publicly traded companies. Stock insurers also tend to have the distinctive pricing risk 
in commercial multiple peril, commercial auto liability, private passenger auto 
liability, workers’ compensation and product liability. As we expected, alien insurers 
exhibit the distinctive pricing risk from the domestic insurers in almost every line of 
product. Nonetheless, the type specificity of pricing risk is not evidently shown for 
mutual, reciprocal, and risk retention group insurers because the results among lines 
of business are mixed.  
When the market is divided into groups of mono-line, few-line and multiple-
line insurers, the homogeneity of pricing risk within these groups in comparison to the 
whole industry, varies among lines of business. In commercial multiple peril, 
homeowners, medical malpractice, private passenger auto liability, and workers’ 
compensation, the model that uses the mono-line or few-line insurers loss ratio as the 
complement of credibility provides a better estimation than the industry model. That 
is, mono-line or few-line insurers exhibit the group-specific pricing risk in these lines 
of business. On the other hand, the pricing risk seems to be specific in the multiple-
line segment in some lines of product such as commercial auto liability, other 
liability, and product liability. 
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 Finally, we question about the pricing risk being unique from the whole 
industry when the market is segmented by the number of states in which the insurers 
do the business. We find that multiple-state insurers have the distinctive pricing risk 
from the overall industry in all lines of business. Besides, medical malpractice and 
product liability show that pricing is segment-specific for mono-line insurers.  
In conclusion, the results basically suggest that using the combination of 
company owned risk and the market-segment risk in predicting the pricing risk for an 
insurer can improve the accuracy of the prediction, especially when the market is 
characterized by firm size, organization structure, and number of states. 
7.2.2. Segment Specificity of Reserving Risk 
Based on the same rationality in the pricing risk analysis, we perform the 
credibility theory to find supports for the hypothesis that the refined segment can 
improve the accuracy of the reserving risk prediction. Since there are some outliers in 
the credibility estimation, we will base our analysis on the median of the squared 
errors so that the misleading effect from the outliers can be eliminated. 
In comparison to the industry model, tables 8.1-8.8 suggest that employing the 
market segmentation by firm size can provide a better prediction for the reserving risk 
in all lines of product. The medians of the squared error indicate that the reserving 
risk appears to be size-specific for large, and giant insurers in all lines of business. 
This finding supports our hypothesis that the lack of knowledge about the risk can 
cause the large insurers to display distinct reserving risk from the overall market. The 
midsize insurers seem to have the size-specific reserving risk features in commercial 
auto liability and workers’ compensation. Only product liability shows that reserving 
risk is size-specific for the small insurers.  
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Furthermore, we study the appropriateness in using the types of companies as 
a principle for the reserving risk classification. With the exception of the commercial 
auto liability, the reserving risk of publicly traded insurers tends to be type-specific, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis. Moreover, the reserving risk seems to be 
unique within the group of stock insurers in commercial multiple peril, other liability, 
private passenger auto liability, and workers’ compensation. For the other type of 
insurers, however, there is no clear evidence that the reserving risk is type-specific as 
the results are mixed across lines of business.  
Considering the market segmentation by number of lines, the result implies 
that reserving risk is segment-specific for multiple-line insurers in commercial 
multiple peril, commercial auto liability, medical malpractice, other liability, and 
workers’ compensation. The mono-line or few-line insurers tend to have the group 
specific reserving risk only in medical malpractice market. Nevertheless, there is no 
evidence that the reserving risk is segment specific in many lines such as 
homeowners, product liability, and private passenger auto liability.   
 Lastly, we find that the reserving risk is segment specific when the market is 
segmented by number of states. The credibility results imply that the multiple-state 
insurers exhibit the unique reserving risk compared with the risk in the overall 
industry in every line except for homeowners and medical malpractice. The mono-
state or few-state insurers appear to have the distinct reserving risk in homeowners 
and medical malpractice. Generally, we find that segmenting the market by number of 
states would enhance the accuracy of the reserving risk prediction. 
7.3. Actuarial Reserving Model Risk 
Figures 2.1-2.2 illustrate the aggregate incurred loss estimates of workers’ 
compensation market according to Chain-Ladder and Bornhuetter-Ferguson methods. 
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The plots in figure 2.1 represent the reversal direction of loss development and the 
failure to recognize such information in the actuarial reserving models. More 
specifically, the incurred losses were favorably developed during year 1992-1996 but 
began to increase in year 1996. However, the Chain-Ladder and Bornhuetter-
Ferguson assume that incurred loss would remain decreasing just like before 1996. As 
a result, the actuarial estimates yield the underestimated forecast of losses. This idea 
is clearly shown in figure 1.1 in which actuarial estimates are materially deviated 
from the actual losses since 1996. 
 Similarly, the loss reserve error created by the actuarial reserving models is 
demonstrated in figure 2.2. The incurred loss was rapidly growing during year 1996-
2000, and though it keeps on increasing, the growth rate diminished in year 2000. 
Unfortunately, the Chain-Ladder and Bornhuetter-Ferguson approaches expect that 
the incurred loss would be decreasing at the same growth rate of years prior to 2000. 
Consequently, the incurred losses are actuarially overestimated in this scenario.  
Based on the individual company data, we demonstrate an empirical analysis 
of actuarial reserving model risk. The Chain-Ladder method, which is popularly used 
for loss reserve estimations, is chosen as a representative of the traditional actuarial 
reserving model.  
 In addition, the insurance companies are also characterized by size of the 
insurers. As pointed out by Wang and Faber (2006) who applied some selected 
insurers as an example, the Chain-Ladder estimation error is likely to be pronounced 
in large insurers and this method seems to work well with the small insurers. 
Accordingly, we speculate that Chain-Ladder method could be a source of loss 
reserve errors and can create the unfavorable errors especially for the large insurers. 
Other than using some selected insurers as a sample, we investigate the actuarial 
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estimate errors of every insurer. We also group the insurance companies by size of 
their premium using each line of business for comparison of the effectiveness of the 
Chain-Ladder method on different size of insurers. Mean and median of the errors are 
presented for each class of insurers, and we will base our analysis on the median of 
the errors for the outlier effect exclusion.  
Applying the Chain-Ladder method, we project the incurred loss for accident-
year 1996, 1999, and 2001. We select these years for the actuarial reserve error 
analysis in that they are the turning points of the underwriting cycle in most of the 
lines of business. The medians of squared errors from the Chain-Ladder estimation 
are exhibited in tables 9.1-9.3 for year 1996, 1999, and 2001 respectively. The 
positive error means that the chain-ladder model underestimate the incurred loss while 
the negative error implies that the model overestimate the incurred loss. However, the 
estimation error depend upon both direction of loss pattern and the growth rate of 
loss, we do not restrict ourselves to expect to see only underestimation in the year that 
loss changes from decreasing to increasing. Therefore, we will focus on the 
magnitude of the errors and the difference of the errors by size of insurers  
In general, the results suggest that the insurers tend to actuarially overestimate 
the losses in the year that the loss pattern changes from moving upward to downward. 
On the other hand, the estimates of loss from the Chain-Ladder technique are likely to 
be undervalued when the loss that was diminishing in the prior years begins to rise in 
the current year. We will discuss the actuarial loss reserve errors created by the 
Chain-Ladder method together with the loss ratio pattern by line of business. Note 
that not only does the actuarial estimate depend on the direction of the movement of 
the losses in prior years, it also depends on the rate of losses development. As a result, 
both loss overestimation and underestimation can be observed in the soft and hard 
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markets. In addition, we also explore the actuarial reserve errors by premium size of 
the companies. As there is not a significant variation of the loss ratio in homeowner 
insurance market, we only include this line as a sample of the property line of 
business. 
Considering the Chain-Ladder estimation errors in the commercial multiple 
peril market, the loss ratio is quite stable from 1991-2000. There is a small jump of 
loss ratio in 2001 and a huge drop in 2002. We focus on the loss estimation error 
occurred in 2001 when a major change of the pattern of the price movement is 
presented. According to table 9.3, the medians of the errors indicate that the Chain-
Ladder method underestimates the losses of the policies that were written in 2001.  
Nevertheless, small, large and giant insurers exaggerate the incurred loss and the 
overestimation is considerable in giant insurers. An explanation for the 
underestimation could be that the increase rate of losses in these classes of insurers is 
small relative to the overall decrease rate of losses in the recent years. In addition, for 
these insurers, the company loss ratios may not track with the industry loss ratios. 
Nevertheless, the considerable errors in large and giant insurers agree with Wang and 
Faber (2006) who suggested that this method do not work well with large insurers.   
Next, we examine the Chain-Ladder reserve error in the commercial auto 
liability industry. The industry plot of loss ratio states that the insurance price had a 
reversal direction and began to increase in 1999. The Chain-Ladder method 
underestimates the losses in this year, and the magnitude of the error is material for 
large and giant insurers as shown in table 9.2. 
In the other liability market, the results confirm our hypothesis that the Chain-
Ladder method is a source of loss reserve estimation errors. In 1996 is the year just 
before the arrival of softening market. Nevertheless, while for the small and midsize 
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insurers the Chain-Ladder method tends to over-estimate loss reserves in this period, 
for the large and giant insurers the Chain-Ladder method tends to underestimate the 
loss reserves. When the market went deep into the soft market in 1999, the Chain-
Ladder method appears to have underestimated the loss reserve for every size of 
insurers. The magnitude of the error is considerable in the large and giant insurers.  
The results in medical malpractice industry also suggest the existence of the 
actuarial estimation errors. In year 1996, insurers have a tendency to underestimate 
the loss reserve if they utilize the Chain-Ladder method as a tool for loss predictions. 
As expected, large and giant insurers show the greater magnitude of the errors in 
comparison to the small insurers. In contrary, the incurred loss appears to be 
underestimated, especially for the large and giant companies, in 2001 when the price 
continues to decrease. The reason for the actuarial underestimation in 2001 could be 
that the rate of decrease in losses is greater than that in the recent years. 
 In product liability market, there are two turning points of the price trend in 
the studied period. In 1999 when the market has a sudden jump of the loss ratio, the 
Chain-Ladder technique seems to provide the underestimation of the loss in every size 
of insurers. The result, therefore, is consistent with the hypothesis that the actuarial 
method can create the loss reserve understatement when loss is adversely developed.  
The similar analysis is performed in workers’ compensation industry. The 
price of workers’ compensation insurance was growing during 1991-1994. It began to 
fall in 1995 and continued to decrease until 1999. The price began to go up again 
from year 1999 onward. With exception of the giant insurers, the other sizes of 
insurers overestimate the loss reserve in 1996 as expected. When the market is in the 
mature soft market in 1999, the Chain-Ladder method appears to underestimate the 
loss reserve except for the giant insurers. In particular, the figure shows that, though it 
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is small in magnitude, the Chain-Ladder technique exaggerates the loss reserves in the 
group of giant insurers.  
Finally, we explore the loss reserve errors that are generated by the Chain-
Ladder estimation in private passenger auto liability. The industry loss ratios indicate 
that the market price does not vary to a great extent during 1991-1998. The price, 
however, has gradually declined since 1999. By projecting the incurred losses, the 
empirical analysis shows that the Chain-Ladder technique underestimates the loss 
reserve in 1999. The loss reserve is underestimated when the incurred loss pattern 
changes in the adverse manner, the actuarial reserve error in large and giant insurers is 
greater than the smaller insurers. This finding substantiates the idea that small insurers 
set the loss reserves more conservatively than the large insurers.  
7.4. Analysis of Benefit from Product Diversification 
7.4.1. Diversification Benefit on the Incurred Losses 
To visualize that our definition for diversification benefit can reflect the 
degree diversification benefit, we plot the diversification benefit on the incurred 
losses by each individual company. The company is sorted by the number of lines 
written, i.e., the company which is further to the right of the x-axis indicates the larger 
number of lines in their portfolio. As shown in figure 3, the diversification benefit 
appears to increase with the number of business lines. The correlation between the 
number of lines and the diversification benefit under this definition is equal to 73.62% 
when all companies are included in the calculation and is equal to 56% if only 
multiple-line insurers are considered.  
Furthermore, we compute the average and median of the diversification 
benefit by the number of product lines. According to table 10, the diversification 
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benefit is increasing with the more number of lines in the insurers’ portfolio. 
However, the decrement of diversification benefit is observed if the insurers write the 
business in more than six lines. The result imply that the diversification effect from 
risk pooling seems to be beneficial if the insurers have less than six lines of product, 
but the diminishing knowledge can take an effect and reduce the diversification 
benefit if the insurers do the business in too many lines.  
Tables 10.1-10.3 exhibit mean and median of the diversification benefit on the 
incurred losses for midsize, large and giant insurers respectively. The results support 
the hypothesis that large companies gain more benefit from product diversification. 
The averages of diversification benefit are 0.078, 0.2, and 0.214 for class of midsize 
insurer, large insurer, and giant insurer respectively. Note that almost every small 
insurer has single line in their portfolio and thus have zero diversification benefit 
under our approach.  
We include the diversification credit under BCAR definition to represent the 
current model used by regulators. The BCAR formula applies the net premium written 
in determining the diversification factor. If an insurer has the net premium written less 
than a specified amount, the BCAR assigns zero diversification credit to that 
company. Otherwise, the calculation is based on the line of business with the highest 
percentage of the net premium written. Unlike the diversification benefit under our 
definition, the BCAR approach fails to consider the risk in every line in the portfolio. 
The diversification factor and diversification benefit have explicit formulas as 
follows. 
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and   
Diversification Benefit = 1 – Diversification factor. 
However, we use the diversification benefit derived from BCAR model as a 
benchmark. Instead of the net premium written, the net premium earned in a given 
accident-year is applied in the BCAR formula for the comparison purpose.  
Table 10 illustrates that the diversification credit under BCAR increases as 
more lines of product are written. This suggests that the BCAR tends to give more 
credit to the companies that write the business in more of product lines. The 
correlation between the number of lines and the diversification benefit under this 
definition is 70.39% when all companies are included in the calculation and is equal 
to 12.50% if only multiple-line insurers are included.  
According to tables 10.1-10.3, large companies reap more product 
diversification benefit than the small sizes. The averages of diversification benefit are 
0.022, 0.118, and 0.161 for class of midsize insurer, large insurer, and giant insurer 
respectively.  
Comparing our definition and BCAR formula, our definition shows the higher 
correlation between the diversification benefit and number of product lines, especially 
when only multiple-line insurers are included in the correlation computation (56% vs. 
12.5%).  The greater correlation under our definition implies that our approach can 
reflect the product diversification benefit, which tends to tie to the number of lines, 
better than the BCAR definition. Another advantage of our approach is that it is a 
predictive model that includes the historical years of data in the calculation, while 
BCAR employs the present year data for the calculation.  
According to table 10, mean and median of the correlation in each group of 
the number of lines suggest that the diversification credit is higher under our 
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definition relative to those derived from the BCAR formula. For example, the average 
of diversification benefit for the five-line insurers is 0.309 under our approach, while 
it is 0.124 under BCAR definition. Moreover, 62.09% of the insurers have the higher 
diversification factor if our definition is used rather than the BCAR formula. 
Therefore, the BCAR formula tends to undervalue the benefit from product 
diversification for some companies if our proposed measure were more effective. 
7.4.2. Diversification Benefit on the Reserving Risk 
Figure 5 exhibits insurers’ diversification benefit on the loss development. The 
result suggests that diversification benefit generally increases with the number of 
business lines. The correlation between the number of lines and the diversification 
benefit on the loss development is equal to 64.22% when all companies are included 
in the calculation and is equal to 34.76% if only multiple-line insurers are included.  
Next, we look into the diversification benefit when the insurers are grouped by 
their number of lines of business. The average and median of the diversification 
benefit are shown in table 11. With exception of the group of insurers who have four 
lines of product in their portfolio, the diversification benefit on the loss development 
is increasing as the insurers have more lines of business in their portfolio. 
Nonetheless, the diversification benefit in the four-line group of insurers is greater 
than groups of insurers who write the business in less than seven lines. The result 
implies that the product diversification, under our definition, does not show clear 
beneficial effect to the reserving risk. However, when we consider the diversification 
benefit in different size of insurers, we find that large companies benefit from product 
diversification compared with small insurers, according to table 12. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
8. Conclusion 
This dissertation analyzes the relationship between pricing and reserving risks 
for property-casualty insurance companies. We hypothesize that pricing and reserving 
risks are, knowingly or unknowingly, correlated. We also expect that the degree of the 
interactions varies by insurers’ risk characteristics for which we categorize in terms of 
firm size, firm structure, product diversification, and geographic diversification.  
We find that, in a given accident year, underestimation of ultimate losses will 
lead to under-pricing, and vice versa, in casualty lines, especially in the long-tailed 
lines such as workers’ compensation, other liability, and medical malpractice. For 
long-tailed lines, insurers use the estimated loss ratios, which are calculated from the 
immature data, to set reserves. Hence, the under-pricing is the root cause for under-
reserving. The results also imply that pricing and reserving process are subject to the 
same pressures, e.g., pressures from management; therefore prices and reserves tend 
to be “miscalculated” in the same direction.  
Even though we do not find that the loss reserve adjustment decisions are 
associated with the price level in a given period, we find that change in premium rate 
from the prior year and the loss reserve adjustments are correlated. We learn that price 
increment (decrement) and adverse (favorable) loss adjustment are simultaneous in 
casualty lines of business, implying that loss reserve errors can be a result of 
manipulation of the timing of loss recognition. Basically, this supports the co-
coupling of the underwriting cycle and reserve cycle. In a hard market, companies 
 114
bump up their reserves while increasing insurance prices. In a soft market, companies 
take down reserves to support their price cutting in competing for market shares. 
Furthermore, we find that the link of pricing and reserving risks is associated 
with the size of companies. The empirical analysis indicates that price-reserve 
correlations are more pronounced in large insurers. This supports our intuition that 
large insurers, who tend to lack of information about the losses and resort more to 
experience rating, are likely to wrongly estimate the loss ratios and thus the loss 
reserves. We find the similar result in the analysis of correlations between change in 
prices and loss reserves. The insurers, especially large insurers, tend to increase their 
loss reserves in the year that prices rise since the increase in prices can provide funds 
for the loss reserve revision.  
Disregarding the alien insurers, the publicly traded insurers and/or stock 
insurers exhibit higher correlations between pricing and reserving errors. As discussed 
before, the strong correlations can be a consequence of the earning pressures and 
revenue-based compensation in stock insurers. However, the results do not show clear 
evidence that the timings of loss reserve adjustment and the shift of underwriting 
policy vary according to the firm structure. 
According to the empirical results, product diversification generally does not 
play a significant role in the interaction between price and reserve errors. Whether the 
benefits from product diversification or the expertise from writing in few lines of 
business have more influence on the interaction between pricing and reserving are 
ambiguous.  
In contrast, the empirical results suggest muti-state insurers exhibit higher 
correlations between accident-year prices and ultimate loss development. Our findings 
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have implications for multiple-state insurers. The geographic diversification tends to 
diminish the geographical expertise and aggravate pricing and reserving errors.  
In general, the empirical analysis indicates that the interactions between 
pricing and reserving errors are stronger in large insurers, stock insurers, and 
multiple-state insurers. On the other hand, the interaction between change in premium 
rate and loss reserve adjustment are more related to size of insurers rather than types, 
number of lines, and number of states characteristics.  
Additionally, the credibility theory is applied as a tool for measuring the 
uniqueness of underwriting risks in market segments.  We find that pricing risk is 
marginally more homogenous within a market segment when size, type, and number 
of states are employed as criteria for market segmentation. Pricing risk and reserving 
risk generally are size-specific and type-specific, especially for large insurers and 
stock insurers. The results have implication that introducing the refined-segment by 
firm size, firm structure, and geographic diversification in risk assessment would 
improve the accuracy of the pricing and reserving risk prediction.  
Our results suggest that loss reserve errors can be a consequence of actuarial 
reserving models, especially for large insurers. The Chain-Ladder reserving method 
tends to exaggerate losses in the year that shows favorable loss development 
comparing to the prior years and is likely to underestimate the losses in the year that 
has adverse loss development relative to the prior years.  
Finally, our proposed measurement method for product diversification benefit 
provides support for the notion that the product diversification benefit on the incurred 
losses and loss development, regardless of the firm size, increases with the number of 
lines in the portfolio. However, the diminishing knowledge tends to decrease the 
product diversification benefit on the incurred losses when an insurer writes the 
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business in excessively many lines. This implication of this finding develops a better 
understanding of product diversification benefit against the lack of expertise, and can 
be useful for the firm risk management. 
In conclusion, our findings provide an understanding of the pricing and 
reserving risk and their interaction in both actuarial practice and behavioral aspects. 
The insight provides a guide for pricing and reserving decisions, and encourages the 
firm risk management to consider the firm’s expertise and agency/incentive problems. 
The over-reliance on experience rating in large companies can lead to under-pricing; 
companies need to establish benchmarks for the true risk exposure so they can track 
the changes in risks more accurately than using the loss experience (Wang and Faber, 
2006).  
Since our findings affirm the link between pricing and reserving in long-tailed 
business, tracking the pricing data in the loss reserving process and using the 
reserving process as a part of information for pricing would enable better pricing and 
reserving risk assessment. 
Our research also may have implication for the financial regulation whose 
activities are affected by reserve errors and their consequences for pricing errors.  The 
market regulation, including risk-based capital but not limited to, should truly reflects 
the link between pricing and reserving and firm risk characteristics. Additionally, the 
variation of results in insurers even in the same line of business encourage the 
incorporation of company own data in conjunction with industry/segment data in the 
risk-based capital requirement. We envision that our findings, more or less, can offer 
a guide for developing the more effective risk-based capital regulation. 
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APPENDIX 
Incurred Bornhuetter-Ferguson Method 
The Incurred Bornhuetter-Ferguson (BF) method assigns partial weight to the 
initial expected losses (calculated from the initial expected loss ratio), and partial 
weight to the observed incurred losses. The weights assigned to the initial expected 
losses decrease as the accident year matures. This method can be viewed as using 
Bayesian approach. 
The basic idea behind this method is that the developed loss is equal to what is 
actually paid plus what we would expect to develop if the Expected Loss Ratio (ER) 
was correct. According to the loss development triangle, the expected loss ratio is 
typically defined as 
    
0
,0
P
S
ER n= , 
where 0P  is the earned premium of the first year accident that appears in the loss 
development triangle table. The ER is assumed to be constant for accident years 
thereafter. 
The final estimate of the ultimate loss is based on the expected loss (typically 
the product of the expected loss ratio and the earned premium) and the Chain-Ladder 
estimate. The estimate of ultimate loss can be expressed in a formal form as: 
iini
BF
ni ELf
SS ×−+= − )11(,,   , 
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and BFniS , is the Bornheutter-Ferguson ultimate loss of accident year i and development 
year n; iniS −,  is the actual losses developed to date figure (see loss development 
triangle); and EL is expected losses which is equal to the expected loss ratio times the 
earned premium of accident year i. 
Using credibility factor (Z), the BF ultimate loss can be re-written as:  
i
CL
ni
BF
ni ELzSzS ×−+×= )1(,,   , 
where 
f
z 1= . 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Loss Development Triangle  
Development Year Accident 
Year 0 1 … k … n-i … n-1 N 
0 S0,0 S0,1 … S0,k … S0,n-i … S0,n-1 S0,n 
1 S1,0 S1,1 … S1,k … S1,n-i … S1,n-1  
M  M  M   M   M     
I Si,0 Si,1 … Si,k … Si,n-i    
M  M  M   M       
n-k Sn-k,0 Sn-k,1 … Sn-k,k      
M  M  M         
n-1 Sn-1,0 Sn-1,1        
N Sn,0         
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the loss ratios during 1991-2004 
Commercial Multiple Peril Commercial Auto Liability Other Liability Medical Malpractice Accident Year 
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
1991 425 63.62% 24.60% 376 73.16% 17.95% 468 59.05% 31.89% 74 77.64% 30.99% 
1992 461 88.56% 87.66% 414 73.87% 21.08% 503 58.12% 31.49% 78 74.69% 29.59% 
1993 479 69.84% 38.02% 426 77.54% 20.45% 520 60.82% 30.77% 98 82.84% 35.28% 
1994 491 75.25% 28.73% 442 80.66% 22.19% 554 65.17% 40.74% 104 84.58% 33.44% 
1995 490 67.83% 24.23% 446 80.86% 32.97% 555 62.49% 32.93% 104 93.33% 40.38% 
1996 489 75.92% 22.68% 445 80.86% 18.91% 555 65.52% 31.25% 103 105.62% 43.56% 
1997 492 67.42% 21.69% 445 85.73% 25.39% 554 67.94% 30.10% 104 120.82% 76.59% 
1998 493 84.23% 48.53% 443 89.81% 34.15% 553 78.05% 42.31% 105 135.05% 77.27% 
1999 492 82.73% 28.45% 442 94.70% 26.68% 551 89.18% 51.21% 105 146.38% 89.03% 
2000 492 81.25% 33.55% 440 94.49% 30.39% 550 89.59% 48.43% 104 136.27% 58.21% 
2001 489 86.55% 60.64% 441 83.79% 25.44% 554 82.72% 42.79% 101 119.39% 40.74% 
2002 479 59.77% 18.12% 439 71.20% 19.41% 549 70.13% 37.14% 101 104.09% 34.84% 
2003 473 57.08% 21.58% 426 66.74% 16.49% 537 60.66% 22.30% 96 87.76% 35.01% 
2004 460 59.91% 30.00% 414 66.53% 15.98% 532 63.36% 27.43% 95 81.26% 25.54% 
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Table 2 (Continue) 
Private Passenger Auto Liability Workers Compensation Product Liability Homeowners Accident Year 
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N* Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
1991 474 81.06% 16.76% 311 81.05% 15.66%    474 79.85% 24.17% 
1992 526 77.89% 14.96% 339 72.57% 15.57%    511 97.24% 113.70% 
1993 547 77.40% 13.65% 360 63.94% 12.99%    530 75.68% 25.10% 
1994 560 78.51% 13.97% 373 62.02% 13.09% 146 91.19% 61.72% 547 82.50% 22.89% 
1995 565 78.43% 14.89% 376 62.34% 14.79% 150 85.62% 51.63% 551 74.20% 18.94% 
1996 565 77.73% 12.82% 377 67.39% 15.87% 148 87.26% 64.53% 552 86.66% 27.41% 
1997 566 76.49% 12.96% 377 76.17% 18.85% 148 105.49% 69.79% 549 64.97% 18.33% 
1998 564 78.64% 19.49% 377 86.87% 23.19% 143 109.96% 114.82% 550 78.60% 30.89% 
1999 563 82.51% 15.22% 378 99.36% 27.72% 135 141.26% 185.30% 548 71.28% 19.82% 
2000 566 87.81% 17.49% 376 99.84% 24.14% 140 129.53% 115.73% 549 78.68% 22.20% 
2001 561 85.82% 15.03% 377 92.42% 20.93% 133 109.11% 102.21% 548 82.34% 27.15% 
2002 557 83.81% 16.25% 372 80.90% 15.77% 137 82.94% 52.51% 541 70.42% 19.07% 
2003 544 78.66% 14.31% 366 75.42% 15.08% 132 78.04% 61.57% 534 68.89% 19.95% 
2004 534 78.50% 14.61% 357 77.17% 14.70% 153 73.91% 42.61% 525 69.21% 45.16% 
* The data file for product liability in year 1993 is damaged. We thus report the data since 1994. 
 126
 
Table 3: Industry aggregate level -- correlations between accident-year direct loss 
ratio and loss development  
 CMP CAL OL MM PPA WC PL HO 
All 0.615 0.891 0.953 0.870 0.638 0.915 0.908 0.233 
Small 0.557 0.860 0.676 0.694 0.446 0.951 0.369 0.586 
Midsize 0.752 0.759 0.931 0.787 0.764 0.969 0.764 0.328 
Large 0.522 0.913 0.953 0.885 0.618 0.918 0.618 0.197 
Giant 0.507 0.507 0.942 0.913 0.567 0.898 0.901 0.190 
CMP = Commercial Multiple Peril ; CAL = Commercial Auto Liability; HO = Homeowners; OL = Other 
Liability; MM = Medical Malpractice; PPA = Private Passenger Auto Liability; WC  = Workers’ Compensation; 
PL = Product Liability 
 
 
Table 3.1: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year direct loss ratio and loss development in commercial multiple peril  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 502 0.388* 0.311 0.452 86.06% 
Small 125 0.357* 0.323 0.442 84.80% 
Midsize 251 0.390* 0.316 0.448 86.85% 
Large 126 0.414* 0.289 0.466 85.71% 
Giant 26 0.345* 0.337 0.438 76.92% 
Public Stock 39 0.519* 0.300 0.628 92.31% 
Stock 351 0.426* 0.305 0.502 87.18% 
Mutual 150 0.295* 0.315 0.358 82.67% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 8 0.317* 0.285 0.183 100.00% 
Alien 8 0.430 0.179 0.386 100.00% 
Mono-line 19 0.254 0.360 0.292 78.95% 
Multiple-line 487 0.382* 0.311 0.446 85.63% 
Few-line 59 0.425* 0.308 0.518 89.83% 
Mono-state 117 0.348* 0.339 0.411 83.76% 
Multiple-state 416 0.396* 0.309 0.467 85.82% 
Few-state 187 0.342* 0.340 0.415 82.35% 
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Table 3.2: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year direct loss ratio and loss development in commercial auto liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 451 0.494* 0.361 0.629 91.35% 
Small 112 0.488* 0.380 0.614 88.39% 
Midsize 226 0.483* 0.354 0.583 91.59% 
Large 113 0.521* 0.359 0.681 93.81% 
Giant 23 0.609* 0.359 0.752 95.65% 
Public Stock 27 0.576* 0.341 0.688 92.59% 
Stock 424 0.488* 0.362 0.620 91.27% 
Mutual 346 0.524* 0.363 0.665 92.20% 
Risk Retention Group 103 0.411* 0.319 0.458 90.29% 
Reciprocal 2 0.044 0.069 0.044 50.00% 
Alien 9 0.337 0.511 0.558 77.78% 
Mono-line 5 0.577* 0.254 0.574 100.00% 
Multiple-line 13 0.650* 0.253 0.690 92.31% 
Few-line 436 0.494* 0.360 0.631 91.51% 
Mono-state 57 0.558* 0.374 0.687 91.23% 
Multiple-state 78 0.461* 0.390 0.625 87.18% 
Few-state 391 0.502* 0.360 0.644 92.07% 
 
Table 3.3: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year direct loss ratio and loss development in other liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 567 0.508* 0.328 0.592 90.65% 
Small 141 0.464* 0.286 0.478 92.91% 
Midsize 284 0.488* 0.345 0.576 88.73% 
Large 142 0.593* 0.320 0.704 92.25% 
Giant 29 0.633* 0.425 0.835 86.21% 
Public Stock 53 0.572* 0.254 0.661 96.23% 
Stock 421 0.547* 0.329 0.626 91.69% 
Mutual 135 0.405* 0.290 0.422 88.89% 
Risk Retention Group 19 0.425* 0.372 0.521 78.95% 
Reciprocal 15 0.453* 0.368 0.559 86.67% 
Alien 7 0.588* 0.257 0.599 100.00% 
Mono-line 69 0.468* 0.350 0.603 82.61% 
Multiple-line 517 0.505* 0.329 0.589 90.91% 
Few-line 133 0.518* 0.343 0.615 87.22% 
Mono-state 102 0.447* 0.314 0.503 91.18% 
Multiple-state 491 0.514* 0.332 0.603 90.22% 
Few-state 166 0.498* 0.302 0.550 93.98% 
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Table 3.4: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year direct loss ratio and loss development in medical malpractice  
 
N Mean S.D. Median 
% of 
positive 
correlation 
All 107 0.631* 0.268 0.743 95.33% 
Small 26 0.574 0.286 0.650 92.31% 
Midsize 54 0.617* 0.283 0.751 94.44% 
Large 27 0.715* 0.197 0.781 100.00% 
Giant 6 0.605* 0.251 0.626 100.00% 
Public Stock 16 0.704* 0.147 0.763 100.00% 
Stock 77 0.638* 0.264 0.743 96.10% 
Mutual 25 0.699* 0.223 0.784 96.00% 
Risk Retention Group 9 0.646* 0.181 0.624 100.00% 
Reciprocal 12 0.522* 0.305 0.572 91.67% 
Alien 1 0.763  0.763 100.00% 
Mono-line 36 0.591* 0.318 0.745 91.67% 
Multiple-line 94 0.635* 0.270 0.746 94.68% 
Few-line 67 0.631* 0.299 0.765 92.54% 
Mono-state 34 0.655 0.286 0.773 94.12% 
Multiple-state 88 0.625* 0.267 0.718 94.32% 
Few-state 51 0.646* 0.300 0.774 92.16% 
 
Table 3.5: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year direct loss ratio and loss development in private passenger auto liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 577 0.417* 0.362 0.469 86.66% 
Small 144 0.415* 0.350 0.446 87.50% 
Midsize 288 0.401* 0.357 0.466 86.81% 
Large 145 0.451* 0.382 0.552 85.52% 
Giant 29 0.459* 0.398 0.523 79.31% 
Public Stock 27 0.452* 0.298 0.593 88.89% 
Stock 429 0.426* 0.376 0.494 86.01% 
Mutual 139 0.409* 0.310 0.430 89.93% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 14 0.253* 0.397 0.338 71.43% 
Alien 3 -0.030* 0.112 -0.094 33.33% 
Mono-line 12 0.439* 0.260 0.412 91.67% 
Multiple-line 565 0.414* 0.362 0.465 86.55% 
Few-line 127 0.428* 0.379 0.517 85.04% 
Mono-state 186 0.390* 0.384 0.446 83.87% 
Multiple-state 449 0.432* 0.351 0.482 87.97% 
Few-state 279 0.394* 0.384 0.463 84.23% 
 
 129
Table 3.6: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year direct loss ratio and loss development in workers’ compensation  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 398 0.677* 0.245 0.748 98.24% 
Small 99 0.645* 0.238 0.693 98.99% 
Midsize 199 0.678* 0.268 0.761 96.98% 
Large 100 0.707* 0.196 0.776 100.00% 
Giant 20 0.723* 0.211 0.776 100.00% 
Public Stock 30 0.684* 0.202 0.663 100.00% 
Stock 292 0.697* 0.221 0.761 98.63% 
Mutual 99 0.616* 0.298 0.689 96.97% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 12 0.662* 0.240 0.710 100.00% 
Alien 5 0.759* 0.239 0.890 100.00% 
Mono-line 65 0.590* 0.341 0.676 95.38% 
Multiple-line 359 0.682* 0.246 0.757 98.05% 
Few-line 99 0.632* 0.307 0.719 95.96% 
Mono-state 100 0.648* 0.276 0.733 98.00% 
Multiple-state 341 0.681* 0.237 0.746 98.24% 
Few-state 144 0.663* 0.261 0.738 98.61% 
* Significant at α=0.05 
 
 
Table 3.7: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year direct loss ratio and loss development in product liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 170 0.475* 0.298 0.534 91.18% 
Small 42 0.534* 0.213 0.567 100.00% 
Midsize 85 0.471 0.292 0.509 89.41% 
Large 43 0.426* 0.369 0.474 86.05% 
Giant 9 0.683* 0.122 0.704 100.00% 
Public Stock 14 0.509* 0.265 0.554 92.86% 
Stock 141 0.475* 0.292 0.537 90.78% 
Mutual 26 0.497* 0.305 0.503 96.15% 
Risk Retention Group 2 0.170 0.675 0.170 0.00% 
Reciprocal 1 0.537  0.537 100.00% 
Alien 9 0.447* 0.240 0.389 100.00% 
Mono-line 7 0.345* 0.399 0.489 85.71% 
Multiple-line 162 0.480* 0.295 0.537 91.36% 
Few-line 22     0.384 0.349 0.469 90.91% 
Mono-state 6 0.312 0.207 0.332 100.00% 
Multiple-state 160 0.479* 0.302 0.544 90.63% 
Few-state 17 0.344 0.379 0.451 88.24% 
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Table 3.8: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year direct loss ratio and loss development in homeowners  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 568 0.233* 0.296 0.240 80.81% 
Small 142 0.239* 0.293 0.199 83.80% 
Midsize 284 0.236* 0.312 0.263 78.87% 
Large 142 0.221* 0.266 0.226 81.69% 
Giant 29 0.211 0.280 0.248 75.86% 
Public Stock 29 0.219* 0.243 0.205 86.21% 
Stock 331 0.241* 0.274 0.238 84.89% 
Mutual 229 0.208* 0.326 0.239 74.67% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 12 0.309* 0.310 0.326 75.00% 
Alien 3 -0.214 0.415 -0.109 33.33% 
Mono-line 14 0.262* 0.238 0.253 92.86% 
Multiple-line 551 0.228* 0.296 0.234 80.40% 
Few-line 62 0.278* 0.261 0.269 87.10% 
Mono-state 183 0.244* 0.293 0.253 81.42% 
Multiple-state 423 0.222* 0.291 0.229 80.38% 
Few-state 268 0.245* 0.295 0.258 80.97% 
 
Table 4: Industry aggregate level -- correlations between accident-year net loss ratio 
and one-calendar-year loss development  
 CMP CAL OL MM PPA WC PL HO 
All -0.715 0.085 -0.666 0.247 0.448 -0.071 -0.186 0.148 
Small -0.755 0.008 -0.850 0.084 0.520 0.402 0.945 -0.102 
Midsize -0.300 0.012 -0.664 0.087 0.322 0.125 0.322 0.067 
Large -0.705 0.090 -0.678 0.205 0.481 -0.096 0.481 0.158 
Giant -0.779 0.128 -0.632 0.490 0.533 -0.249 -0.555 0.144 
Note: 1 CY loss development = One calendar year loss development ÷ Earned Premium 
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Table 4.1: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in commercial multiple 
peril  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 492 -0.076* 0.329 -0.069 42.28% 
Small 120 -0.079 0.288 -0.069 41.67% 
Midsize 248 -0.063* 0.327 -0.062 42.74% 
Large 124 -0.097* 0.371 -0.097 41.94% 
Giant 26 -0.137 0.329 -0.173 38.46% 
Public Stock 39 0.035 0.261 0.101 53.85% 
Stock 345 -0.096* 0.337 -0.094 39.71% 
Mutual 146 -0.025 0.305 -0.010 48.63% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 8 -0.095 0.365 -0.324 37.50% 
Alien 8 0.073 0.288 0.016 62.50% 
Mono-line 18 -0.072* 0.381 -0.114 27.78% 
Multiple-line 477 -0.080* 0.328 -0.070 42.14% 
Few-line 56 -0.090* 0.343 -0.122 33.93% 
Mono-state 114 -0.063* 0.321 -0.089 42.11% 
Multiple-state 408 -0.084* 0.327 -0.069 41.67% 
Few-state 180 -0.053* 0.323 -0.068 43.89% 
 
Table 4.2: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in commercial auto 
liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 366 0.029* 0.375 0.058 55.19% 
Small 74 -0.073 0.377 -0.097 45.95% 
Midsize 188 0.033 0.366 0.047 55.32% 
Large 104 0.092* 0.380 0.112 61.54% 
Giant 22 0.118* 0.384 0.177 68.18% 
Public Stock 21 0.067* 0.463 0.090 61.90% 
Stock 281 0.030* 0.383 0.066 56.23% 
Mutual 88 0.021 0.339 0.020 51.14% 
Risk Retention Group 1 -0.724  -0.724 0.00% 
Reciprocal 5 -0.127 0.494 -0.299 40.00% 
Alien 4 0.081 0.270 0.138 75.00% 
Mono-line 9 0.039 0.436 0.043 66.67% 
Multiple-line 358 0.033* 0.375 0.065 55.59% 
Few-line 38 -0.001* 0.351 0.009 52.63% 
Mono-state 55 -0.056 0.378 -0.069 40.00% 
Multiple-state 328 0.039* 0.374 0.085 57.93% 
Few-state 96 -0.050* 0.393 -0.073 41.67% 
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Table 4.3: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in other liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 553 -0.088* 0.381 -0.056 44.12% 
Small 136 -0.085* 0.358 -0.029 47.06% 
Midsize 276 -0.070* 0.395 -0.051 45.29% 
Large 141 -0.124* 0.374 -0.089 39.01% 
Giant 28 -0.298* 0.383 -0.417 25.00% 
Public Stock 53 0.066* 0.316 0.050 60.38% 
Stock 411 -0.114* 0.383 -0.094 39.42% 
Mutual 132 -0.032 0.371 0.049 54.55% 
Risk Retention Group 16 -0.005* 0.490 0.068 50.00% 
Reciprocal 15 0.122* 0.238 0.088 80.00% 
Alien 7 -0.083* 0.570 -0.117 28.57% 
Mono-line 61 -0.041* 0.363 0.022 55.74% 
Multiple-line 505 -0.090* 0.377 -0.062 42.97% 
Few-line 123 -0.084* 0.401 -0.001 49.59% 
Mono-state 97 -0.001 0.326 0.035 56.70% 
Multiple-state 479 -0.101* 0.382 -0.067 42.80% 
Few-state 158 -0.039* 0.351 0.015 51.90% 
 
Table 4.4: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in medical malpractice  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 105 -0.005* 0.378 0.050 53.33% 
Small 26 0.070 0.345 0.084 57.69% 
Midsize 52 -0.064* 0.396 -0.058 44.23% 
Large 27 0.036* 0.369 0.093 66.67% 
Giant 6 -0.167* 0.608 -0.164 50.00% 
Public Stock 16 0.044 0.384 0.071 56.25% 
Stock 76 0.016* 0.372 0.055 55.26% 
Mutual 23 0.066 0.401 0.161 65.22% 
Risk Retention Group 9 -0.228 0.272 -0.320 11.11% 
Reciprocal 12 -0.288* 0.278 -0.359 16.67% 
Alien 1 0.248  0.248 100.00% 
Mono-line 34 -0.142* 0.402 -0.114 35.29% 
Multiple-line 94 0.023* 0.376 0.061 56.38% 
Few-line 65 -0.069* 0.379 -0.047 46.15% 
Mono-state 32 -0.004 0.387 0.024 50.00% 
Multiple-state 87 0.021* 0.376 0.062 57.47% 
Few-state 49 -0.046 0.375 -0.002 48.98% 
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Table 4.5: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in private passenger auto 
liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 567 0.130* 0.396 0.158 62.79% 
Small 137 0.157* 0.375 0.214 64.23% 
Midsize 286 0.105* 0.395 0.115 60.49% 
Large 144 0.155* 0.418 0.223 65.97% 
Giant 28 0.196* 0.395 0.274 71.43% 
Public Stock 26 0.329* 0.379 0.313 84.62% 
Stock 422 0.132* 0.409 0.163 62.56% 
Mutual 138 0.154 0.335 0.184 64.49% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 14 -0.114* 0.498 -0.078 50.00% 
Alien 3 -0.313* 0.621 -0.381 33.33% 
Mono-line 11 0.212 0.279 0.230 72.73% 
Multiple-line 556 0.130* 0.398 0.158 62.41% 
Few-line 122 0.077* 0.391 0.094 58.20% 
Mono-state 182 0.070 0.392 0.094 57.14% 
Multiple-state 443 0.155* 0.396 0.188 65.24% 
Few-state 269 0.079* 0.386 0.098 57.62% 
 
Table 4.6: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in workers’ compensation  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 379 0.034* 0.355 0.047 56.46% 
Small 90 0.075* 0.340 0.107 61.11% 
Midsize 191 0.038* 0.347 0.078 56.54% 
Large 98 -0.010* 0.381 0.012 52.04% 
Giant 19 -0.229* 0.340 -0.375 26.32% 
Public Stock 29 0.254* 0.233 0.272 86.21% 
Stock 285 0.034* 0.335 0.030 56.49% 
Mutual 90 0.045 0.399 0.133 58.89% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 12 -0.019 0.468 -0.011 50.00% 
Alien 5 -0.027 0.261 -0.070 40.00% 
Mono-line 52 -0.099* 0.352 -0.129 36.54% 
Multiple-line 349 0.055* 0.348 0.082 59.60% 
Few-line 82 -0.084* 0.339 -0.103 34.15% 
Mono-state 86 -0.034 0.358 -0.093 45.35% 
Multiple-state 332 0.044* 0.350 0.055 57.83% 
Few-state 125 -0.057 0.358 -0.073 43.20% 
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Table 4.7: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in product liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 105 -0.110* 0.408 -0.124 39.05% 
Small 20 -0.083* 0.359 -0.124 40.00% 
Midsize 53 -0.108* 0.379 -0.124 39.62% 
Large 32 -0.129* 0.487 -0.145 37.50% 
Giant 6 -0.335 0.375 -0.471 16.67% 
Public Stock 7 -0.139 0.283 -0.152 14.29% 
Stock 85 -0.117* 0.427 -0.133 36.47% 
Mutual 20 -0.041 0.299 0.018 55.00% 
Risk Retention Group 2 0.003 0.610 0.003 50.00% 
Reciprocal 1 -0.603  -0.603 0.00% 
Alien 7 -0.219 0.374 -0.196 14.29% 
Mono-line 3 -0.220 0.023 -0.223 0.00% 
Multiple-line 103 -0.117* 0.409 -0.133 37.86% 
Few-line 11 -0.176 0.319 -0.196 27.27% 
Mono-state 2 0.052 0.415 0.052 50.00% 
Multiple-state 101 -0.120* 0.409 -0.133 37.62% 
Few-state 7 -0.024 0.346 -0.039 42.86% 
 
Table 4.8: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between accident-
year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in homeowners  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 552 0.036* 0.331 0.041 53.80% 
Small 131 0.011 0.313 0.028 51.91% 
Midsize 280 0.035* 0.340 0.043 53.57% 
Large 141 0.062 0.328 0.044 56.03% 
Giant 28 0.108* 0.315 0.135 75.00% 
Public Stock 29 -0.045 0.348 -0.002 48.28% 
Stock 326 0.071* 0.339 0.089 58.59% 
Mutual 220 -0.027* 0.322 -0.033 46.36% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 12 0.086 0.250 0.059 50.00% 
Alien 3 -0.268 0.268 -0.299 33.33% 
Mono-line 13 -0.070 0.425 -0.199 30.77% 
Multiple-line 536 0.037* 0.329 0.045 54.48% 
Few-line 59 0.043* 0.367 -0.013 49.15% 
Mono-state 172 0.027* 0.324 0.058 54.65% 
Multiple-state 418 0.043* 0.333 0.045 54.55% 
Few-state 253 0.019* 0.317 0.008 50.99% 
 
Table 5: Industry aggregate level -- correlations between change in accident-year net 
loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development  
 CMP CAL OL MM PPA WC PL HO 
All -0.435 -0.783 -0.641 -0.725 -0.112 -0.799 -0.082 -0.110 
Small -0.735 -0.269 -0.708 -0.386 -0.083 -0.635 0.728 -0.473 
Midsize -0.485 -0.582 -0.619 -0.703 -0.504 -0.787 -0.504 -0.090 
Large -0.360 -0.796 -0.634 -0.621 -0.080 -0.769 -0.080 -0.096 
Giant -0.224 -0.224 -0.423 -0.335 0.017 -0.730 -0.135 -0.109 
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Table 5.1: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between change in 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in commercial 
multiple peril  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 492 -0.148* 0.299 -0.144 28.05% 
Small 120 -0.143* 0.290 -0.133 30.00% 
Midsize 248 -0.170* 0.294 -0.171 25.40% 
Large 124 -0.110 0.313 -0.131 31.45% 
Giant 26 -0.099* 0.313 -0.131 30.77% 
Public Stock 39 -0.193 0.287 -0.210 23.08% 
Stock 345 -0.161* 0.296 -0.166 24.64% 
Mutual 146 -0.127* 0.312 -0.126 33.56% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 8 -0.045 0.220 0.075 62.50% 
Alien 8 0.008 0.358 0.027 50.00% 
Mono-line 18 -0.164 0.427 -0.201 33.33% 
Multiple-line 477 -0.147* 0.296 -0.145 27.88% 
Few-line 56 -0.212 0.360 -0.221 23.21% 
Mono-state 114 -0.112 0.310 -0.109 33.33% 
Multiple-state 408 -0.155* 0.288 -0.152 26.72% 
Few-state 180 -0.119 0.321 -0.122 31.67% 
 
Table 5.2: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between change in 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in commercial 
auto liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 366 -0.182* 0.345 -0.207 25.96% 
Small 74 -0.186* 0.343 -0.182 27.03% 
Midsize 188 -0.161* 0.344 -0.191 25.53% 
Large 104 -0.215 0.350 -0.292 25.96% 
Giant 22 -0.212* 0.386 -0.357 22.73% 
Public Stock 21 -0.016 0.418 -0.126 42.86% 
Stock 281 -0.181* 0.355 -0.214 25.27% 
Mutual 88 -0.191* 0.314 -0.192 25.00% 
Risk Retention Group 1 -0.309  -0.309  
Reciprocal 5 -0.170 0.268 0.004 60.00% 
Alien 4 -0.115 0.326 -0.179 25.00% 
Mono-line 9 0.009 0.459 -0.147 33.33% 
Multiple-line 358 -0.185* 0.344 -0.207 26.26% 
Few-line 38 -0.101 0.361 -0.149 31.58% 
Mono-state 55 -0.176 0.302 -0.187 21.82% 
Multiple-state 328 -0.181* 0.354 -0.211 26.52% 
Few-state 96 -0.158 0.340 -0.172 25.00% 
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Table 5.3: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between change in 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in other liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 553 -0.171* 0.335 -0.190 31.28% 
Small 136 -0.151* 0.353 -0.159 36.76% 
Midsize 276 -0.163* 0.336 -0.179 31.16% 
Large 141 -0.206 0.314 -0.219 26.24% 
Giant 28 -0.291* 0.279 -0.326 17.86% 
Public Stock 53 -0.064 0.276 -0.089 35.85% 
Stock 411 -0.195* 0.340 -0.215 29.44% 
Mutual 132 -0.105* 0.312 -0.108 36.36% 
Risk Retention Group 16 -0.064* 0.320 0.015 56.25% 
Reciprocal 15 -0.126 0.317 -0.100 33.33% 
Alien 7 0.098* 0.388 0.108 57.14% 
Mono-line 61 -0.183* 0.288 -0.173 27.87% 
Multiple-line 505 -0.171* 0.335 -0.189 31.29% 
Few-line 123 -0.161* 0.345 -0.156 34.96% 
Mono-state 97 -0.164* 0.335 -0.167 32.99% 
Multiple-state 479 -0.184* 0.333 -0.200 29.44% 
Few-state 158 -0.162* 0.329 -0.164 34.81% 
 
Table 5.4: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between change in 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in medical 
malpractice  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 105 -0.256* 0.310 -0.280 18.10% 
Small 26 -0.141 0.297 -0.194 30.77% 
Midsize 52 -0.281* 0.323 -0.305 13.46% 
Large 27 -0.317* 0.276 -0.316 14.81% 
Giant 6 -0.219* 0.450 -0.242 33.33% 
Public Stock 16 -0.205* 0.398 -0.256 31.25% 
Stock 76 -0.234* 0.326 -0.273 21.05% 
Mutual 23 -0.280* 0.276 -0.334 17.39% 
Risk Retention Group 9 -0.289* 0.289 -0.397 22.22% 
Reciprocal 12 -0.367* 0.204 -0.340 0.00% 
Alien 1 -0.397  -0.397 0.00% 
Mono-line 34 -0.295* 0.270 -0.341 17.65% 
Multiple-line 94 -0.252* 0.316 -0.279 19.15% 
Few-line 65 -0.313* 0.271 -0.328 12.31% 
Mono-state 32 -0.314* 0.241 -0.331 9.38% 
Multiple-state 87 -0.232* 0.322 -0.272 21.84% 
Few-state 49 -0.326* 0.250 -0.334 8.16% 
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Table 5.5: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between change in 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in private 
passenger auto liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 567 -0.122* 0.314 -0.149 32.80% 
Small 137 -0.114 0.299 -0.139 29.93% 
Midsize 286 -0.136* 0.316 -0.175 31.12% 
Large 144 -0.101* 0.324 -0.101 38.89% 
Giant 28 -0.162 0.383 -0.170 28.57% 
Public Stock 26 -0.011 0.269 0.008 57.69% 
Stock 422 -0.114* 0.322 -0.153 34.60% 
Mutual 138 -0.138* 0.289 -0.137 27.54% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 14 -0.197* 0.293 -0.188 28.57% 
Alien 3 -0.486* 0.279 -0.448 0.00% 
Mono-line 11 -0.149 0.242 -0.169 18.18% 
Multiple-line 556 -0.122* 0.313 -0.149 32.91% 
Few-line 122 -0.152* 0.307 -0.224 24.59% 
Mono-state 182 -0.130* 0.324 -0.193 30.77% 
Multiple-state 443 -0.117* 0.311 -0.140 33.86% 
Few-state 269 -0.139* 0.319 -0.208 29.00% 
 
Table 5.6: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between change in 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in workers’ 
compensation  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 401 -0.257* 0.336 -0.306 19.70% 
Small 90 -0.202* 0.326 -0.181 27.78% 
Midsize 191 -0.267* 0.325 -0.316 17.80% 
Large 98 -0.270* 0.367 -0.309 16.33% 
Giant 19 -0.358* 0.398 -0.306 5.26% 
Public Stock 29 -0.196* 0.324 -0.314 27.59% 
Stock 285 -0.221* 0.350 -0.260 23.16% 
Mutual 90 -0.346* 0.282 -0.372 12.22% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 12 -0.290* 0.225 -0.265 0.00% 
Alien 5 -0.254 0.399 -0.233 40.00% 
Mono-line 52 -0.259* 0.381 -0.332 23.08% 
Multiple-line 349 -0.243* 0.336 -0.286 20.63% 
Few-line 82 -0.237* 0.368 -0.282 24.39% 
Mono-state 86 -0.233* 0.331 -0.255 24.42% 
Multiple-state 332 -0.250* 0.337 -0.301 19.58% 
Few-state 125 -0.281* 0.332 -0.318 19.20% 
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Table 5.7: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between change in 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in product 
liability  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 170 -0.064* 0.442 -0.090 38.82% 
Small 42 -0.123 0.434 -0.103 38.10% 
Midsize 85 -0.037* 0.430 -0.078 40.00% 
Large 43 -0.058* 0.477 -0.090 37.21% 
Giant 9 0.101 0.426 -0.069 44.44% 
Public Stock 14 0.008* 0.598 -0.052 50.00% 
Stock 141 -0.061* 0.446 -0.090 39.72% 
Mutual 26 -0.083 0.366 -0.092 34.62% 
Risk Retention Group 2 0.450 0.763 0.450 50.00% 
Reciprocal 1 -0.764  -0.764  
Alien 9 0.080 0.573 -0.055 44.44% 
Mono-line 7 0.244 0.487 0.045 57.14% 
Multiple-line 162 -0.073* 0.444 -0.096 38.27% 
Few-line 22 0.023 0.407 -0.067 40.91% 
Mono-state 6 -0.128 0.594 -0.176 33.33% 
Multiple-state 160 -0.057* 0.448 -0.089 39.38% 
Few-state 17 -0.094 0.378 -0.090 29.41% 
 
Table 5.8: Company level -- descriptive statistics of correlations between change in 
accident-year net loss ratio and one-calendar-year loss development in homeowners  
 N Mean S.D. Median 
% of positive 
correlation 
All 552 -0.098* 0.323 -0.082 41.30% 
Small 131 -0.118* 0.301 -0.110 40.46% 
Midsize 280 -0.089* 0.336 -0.048 43.57% 
Large 141 -0.098 0.317 -0.117 37.59% 
Giant 28 -0.102* 0.257 -0.039 39.29% 
Public Stock 29 -0.114* 0.285 -0.134 37.93% 
Stock 326 -0.082 0.334 -0.055 44.79% 
Mutual 220 -0.118* 0.299 -0.107 35.91% 
Risk Retention Group 0     
Reciprocal 12 -0.100* 0.409 -0.007 50.00% 
Alien 3 -0.195 0.084 -0.148 0.00% 
Mono-line 13 -0.255 0.409 -0.195 30.77% 
Multiple-line 536 -0.096* 0.320 -0.076 41.42% 
Few-line 59 -0.118 0.365 -0.082 47.46% 
Mono-state 172 -0.121* 0.321 -0.110 37.79% 
Multiple-state 418 -0.090* 0.323 -0.058 42.34% 
Few-state 253 -0.115* 0.326 -0.110 39.13% 
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Table 6: Correlations of residual from vector autoregression analysis 
 
Model 1: 
L = Direct loss ratio 
R = Loss dvlp 
Model 2: 
L = Net loss ratio 
R = CY loss dvlp 
Model 3: 
L = Δ net loss ratio 
R = CY loss dvlp 
CMP 0.025 -0.109* -0.145* 
CAL  0.171* -0.099* -0.087* 
OL  0.095* -0.189* -0.183* 
MM  0.320* 0.398* 0.389* 
PPA  0.071* -0.073* -0.094* 
WC  0.258* -0.459* 0.193* 
PL  0.032* 0.412* 0.341* 
HO 0.061 0.060* 0.030* 
Null 
Hypothesis > 0 < 0 < 0 
 
Table 7.1: Credibility estimation errors of pricing risk in commercial multiple peril  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 467 0.096 0.007 
Small 118 0.036 0.007 
Midsize 233 0.162 0.007 
Large 116 0.023 0.007 
Giant 24 0.049 0.020 
Public Stock 35 0.037 0.001 
Stock 321 0.093 0.007 
Mutual 144 0.104 0.007 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 8 0.010 0.011 
Alien 6 0.093 0.008 
Mono-line 17 0.107 0.010 
Multiple-line 455 0.096 0.007 
Few-line 50 0.065 0.009 
Mono-state 110 0.261 0.009 
Multiple-state 388 0.072 0.007 
Few-state 176 0.196 0.008 
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Table 7.2: Credibility estimation errors of pricing risk in commercial auto liability  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 419 0.023 0.005 
Small 102 0.037 0.007 
Midsize 210 0.022 0.006 
Large 107 0.010 0.002 
Giant 22 0.008 0.002 
Public Stock 24 0.006 0.002 
Stock 321 0.019 0.005 
Mutual 97 0.033 0.008 
Risk Retention Group 2 0.320 0.320 
Reciprocal 8 0.018 0.015 
Alien 4 0.013 0.014 
Mono-line 12 0.060 0.003 
Multiple-line 405 0.021 0.004 
Few-line 54 0.028 0.005 
Mono-state 73 0.051 0.011 
Multiple-state 363 0.017 0.004 
Few-state 131 0.038 0.010 
 
Table 7.3: Credibility estimation errors of pricing risk in other liability  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 542 0.074 0.012 
Small 134 0.073 0.014 
Midsize 272 0.072 0.010 
Large 136 0.078 0.012 
Giant 29 0.124 0.013 
Public Stock 51 0.090 0.017 
Stock 402 0.075 0.010 
Mutual 129 0.065 0.014 
Risk Retention Group 19 0.064 0.016 
Reciprocal 15 0.091 0.016 
Alien 6 0.062 0.045 
Mono-line 68 0.171 0.016 
Multiple-line 494 0.070 0.011 
Few-line 128 0.138 0.016 
Mono-state 102 0.093 0.018 
Multiple-state 468 0.070 0.010 
Few-state 162 0.088 0.015 
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Table 7.4: Credibility estimation errors of pricing risk in medical malpractice  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 96 0.070 0.020 
Small 17 0.038 0.026 
Midsize 52 0.046 0.020 
Large 27 0.135 0.016 
Giant 6 0.349 0.112 
Public Stock 12 0.035 0.023 
Stock 66 0.082 0.015 
Mutual 24 0.039 0.017 
Risk Retention Group 9 0.040 0.037 
Reciprocal 12 0.043 0.019 
Alien 0   
Mono-line 35 0.055 0.024 
Multiple-line 85 0.074 0.022 
Few-line 65 0.054 0.024 
Mono-state 32 0.068 0.026 
Multiple-state 78 0.069 0.017 
Few-state 48 0.059 0.023 
 
Table 7.5: Credibility estimation errors of pricing risk in private passenger auto 
liability 
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 542 0.016 0.002 
Small 132 0.027 0.002 
Midsize 271 0.015 0.002 
Large 139 0.009 0.001 
Giant 29 0.006 0.001 
Public Stock 26 0.005 0.000 
Stock 398 0.016 0.002 
Mutual 135 0.019 0.002 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 14 0.006 0.002 
Alien 2 0.016 0.016 
Mono-line 10 0.002 0.001 
Multiple-line 532 0.016 0.002 
Few-line 113 0.012 0.001 
Mono-state 177 0.022 0.001 
Multiple-state 420 0.013 0.002 
Few-state 264 0.019 0.002 
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Table 7.6: Credibility estimation errors of pricing risk in workers’ compensation  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 374 0.025 0.010 
Small 87 0.040 0.013 
Midsize 192 0.024 0.012 
Large 95 0.012 0.006 
Giant 18 0.006 0.003 
Public Stock 30 0.016 0.005 
Stock 274 0.021 0.011 
Mutual 93 0.034 0.012 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 12 0.032 0.035 
Alien 5 0.003 0.000 
Mono-line 62 0.025 0.008 
Multiple-line 337 0.025 0.010 
Few-line 93 0.028 0.011 
Mono-state 96 0.040 0.011 
Multiple-state 321 0.022 0.010 
Few-state 138 0.033 0.010 
 
Table 7.7: Credibility estimation errors of pricing risk in product liability  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 129 0.094 0.029 
Small 25 0.074 0.023 
Midsize 68 0.116 0.032 
Large 36 0.066 0.039 
Giant 6 0.034 0.016 
Public Stock 10 0.031 0.012 
Stock 106 0.091 0.035 
Mutual 22 0.082 0.025 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 0   
Alien 7 0.029 0.014 
Mono-line 4 0.197 0.123 
Multiple-line 124 0.086 0.029 
Few-line 15 0.138 0.039 
Mono-state 3 0.039 0.039 
Multiple-state 122 0.091 0.029 
Few-state 11 0.161 0.039 
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Table 7.8: Credibility estimation errors of pricing risk in homeowners  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 540 0.225 0.033 
Small 131 0.114 0.020 
Midsize 270 0.263 0.031 
Large 139 0.256 0.038 
Giant 29 0.046 0.038 
Public Stock 27 0.212 0.033 
Stock 304 0.299 0.032 
Mutual 224 0.128 0.028 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 12 0.101 0.115 
Alien 3 0.411 0.187 
Mono-line 12 0.049 0.037 
Multiple-line 525 0.230 0.033 
Few-line 55 0.719 0.038 
Mono-state 175 0.251 0.034 
Multiple-state 398 0.224 0.033 
Few-state 256 0.202 0.033 
 
Table 8.1: Credibility estimation errors of reserving risk in commercial multiple peril  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 479 15.169 0.024 
Small 119 58.824 0.037 
Midsize 240 1.056 0.024 
Large 120 0.104 0.015 
Giant 26 0.153 0.014 
Public Stock 35 0.021 0.013 
Stock 330 21.976 0.019 
Mutual 147 0.085 0.026 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 8 0.076 0.004 
Alien 6 1163.852 0.150 
Mono-line 17 0.110 0.043 
Multiple-line 466 15.588 0.023 
Few-line 54 0.224 0.029 
Mono-state 111 0.132 0.033 
Multiple-state 398 18.229 0.020 
Few-state 178 0.148 0.037 
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Table 8.2: Credibility estimation errors of reserving risk in commercial auto liability  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 430 1.173 0.192 
Small 103 1.710 0.201 
Midsize 218 1.137 0.158 
Large 109 0.739 0.165 
Giant 23 0.270 0.060 
Public Stock 24 0.958 0.357 
Stock 331 1.153 0.196 
Mutual 97 0.848 0.169 
Risk Retention Group 2 9.274 9.274 
Reciprocal 9 3.403 1.513 
Alien 4 12.084 0.382 
Mono-line 13 1.434 0.196 
Multiple-line 416 1.136 0.170 
Few-line 55 1.708 0.353 
Mono-state 77 1.299 0.197 
Multiple-state 371 1.114 0.165 
Few-state 139 1.420 0.224 
 
Table 8.3: Credibility estimation errors of reserving risk in other liability  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 546 252.584 1.283 
Small 135 915.886 2.668 
Midsize 272 19.957 1.540 
Large 139 63.594 0.551 
Giant 29 144.227 0.262 
Public Stock 51 4.645 1.089 
Stock 406 329.437 1.027 
Mutual 130 30.492 2.779 
Risk Retention Group 18 52.373 9.834 
Reciprocal 15 15.500 3.299 
Alien 6 20.902 3.406 
Mono-line 69 34.979 3.808 
Multiple-line 498 273.872 1.072 
Few-line 129 33.905 2.296 
Mono-state 102 91.963 5.510 
Multiple-state 472 274.994 1.067 
Few-state 163 760.989 4.031 
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Table 8.4: Credibility estimation errors of reserving risk in medical malpractice  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 98 0.117 0.010 
Small 18 0.200 0.010 
Midsize 53 0.126 0.010 
Large 27 0.044 0.005 
Giant 6 0.024 0.003 
Public Stock 12 0.012 0.002 
Stock 68 0.155 0.010 
Mutual 24 0.011 0.007 
Risk Retention Group 9 0.013 0.011 
Reciprocal 12 0.066 0.010 
Alien 0   
Mono-line 36 0.046 0.008 
Multiple-line 85 0.110 0.009 
Few-line 67 0.066 0.006 
Mono-state 33 0.085 0.005 
Multiple-state 79 0.124 0.010 
Few-state 50 0.082 0.006 
 
Table 8.5: Credibility estimation errors of reserving risk in private passenger auto 
liability  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 547 0.192 0.008 
Small 133 0.660 0.015 
Midsize 275 0.044 0.009 
Large 139 0.036 0.005 
Giant 29 0.018 0.004 
Public Stock 25 0.045 0.001 
Stock 403 0.246 0.007 
Mutual 135 0.036 0.009 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 14 0.066 0.003 
Alien 3 0.594 0.177 
Mono-line 11 0.069 0.010 
Multiple-line 535 0.194 0.008 
Few-line 116 0.160 0.011 
Mono-state 178 0.122 0.011 
Multiple-state 422 0.200 0.006 
Few-state 268 0.354 0.010 
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Table 8.6: Credibility estimation errors of reserving risk in workers’ compensation  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 383 0.067 0.006 
Small 92 0.086 0.012 
Midsize 193 0.054 0.005 
Large 98 0.072 0.005 
Giant 20 0.036 0.004 
Public Stock 30 0.026 0.004 
Stock 281 0.077 0.005 
Mutual 95 0.035 0.008 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 12 0.039 0.008 
Alien 5 0.010 0.010 
Mono-line 63 0.046 0.007 
Multiple-line 345 0.067 0.005 
Few-line 95 0.107 0.006 
Mono-state 96 0.052 0.010 
Multiple-state 329 0.066 0.005 
Few-state 140 0.085 0.007 
 
Table 8.7: Credibility estimation errors of reserving risk in product liability  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 120 254.036 0.851 
Small 23 33.607 0.835 
Midsize 64 30.007 1.006 
Large 33 842.151 0.688 
Giant 6 0.569 0.355 
Public Stock 10 3.676 0.840 
Stock 99 307.525 0.956 
Mutual 21 1.865 0.351 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 0   
Alien 7 4.476 2.450 
Mono-line 3 2.107 2.451 
Multiple-line 118 23.850 0.850 
Few-line 12 2307.505 1.459 
Mono-state 3 1.647 1.513 
Multiple-state 115 24.429 0.841 
Few-state 8 3464.146 1.245 
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Table 8.8: Credibility estimation errors of reserving risk in homeowners  
Choice of Credibility 
Complement N MSE 
Median of Squared 
Error 
All 547 0.074 0.003 
Small 135 0.107 0.004 
Midsize 273 0.052 0.003 
Large 139 0.086 0.002 
Giant 29 0.019 0.002 
Public Stock 27 0.108 0.001 
Stock 311 0.118 0.003 
Mutual 225 0.015 0.002 
Risk Retention Group 0   
Reciprocal 12 0.006 0.002 
Alien 3 1.161 0.031 
Mono-line 13 0.712 0.021 
Multiple-line 530 0.058 0.003 
Few-line 59 0.183 0.014 
Mono-state 176 0.075 0.003 
Multiple-state 403 0.094 0.003 
Few-state 261 0.060 0.002 
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Table 9.1: Mean and Median of Chain-ladder loss estimation errors of accident-year 
1996  
Commercial Multiple Peril 
AY 1996 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.279 -0.095 -0.037 -0.853 -4.169 
Median 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.067 
      
Commercial Auto Liability 
AY 1996 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.012 -0.085 -0.035 0.084 0.184 
Median 0.019 -0.031 0.015 0.097 0.131 
      
Other Liability 
AY 1996 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.130 -0.377 -0.112 0.043 0.100 
Median 0.039 0.039 0.019 0.073 0.038 
      
Medical Malpractice 
AY 1996 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.320 0.323 0.257 0.423 0.535 
Median 0.271 0.808 0.176 0.339 0.475 
      
Private Passenger Auto Liability 
AY 1996 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.058 -0.134 -0.083 0.045 0.026 
Median -0.012 -0.018 -0.027 0.020 0.012 
      
Workers’ Compensation 
AY 1996 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.089 -0.145 -0.114 -0.009 0.048 
Median -0.076 -0.101 -0.095 -0.031 0.007 
      
Product Liability 
AY 1996 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.288 -1.397 0.082 0.050 0.253 
Median -0.029 -0.190 0.007 0.071 0.224 
      
Homeowners 
AY 1996 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.035 -0.195 -0.059 0.019 0.070 
Median 0.011 -0.002 0.012 0.019 0.013 
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Table 9.2: Mean and Median of Chain-ladder loss estimation errors of accident-year 
1999  
Commercial Multiple Peril 
AY 1999 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.004 -0.142 0.006 0.104 0.132 
Median 0.051 0.012 0.048 0.101 0.120 
      
Commercial Auto Liability 
AY 1999 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.086 0.029 0.051 0.201 0.222 
Median 0.104 0.090 0.079 0.135 0.176 
      
Other Liability 
AY 1999 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.237 0.136 0.023 0.760 0.424 
Median 0.143 0.140 0.105 0.248 0.501 
      
Medical Malpractice 
AY 1999 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.647 1.040 0.449 0.674 0.651 
Median 0.297 0.227 0.263 0.400 0.561 
      
Private Passenger Auto Liability 
AY 1999 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.007 -0.035 -0.032 0.115 0.090 
Median 0.047 0.034 0.038 0.081 0.081 
      
Workers’ Compensation 
AY 1999 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.137 0.110 0.155 0.123 -0.009 
Median 0.190 0.135 0.190 0.215 0.295 
      
Product Liability 
AY 1999 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.384 0.147 0.578 0.216 0.602 
Median 0.144 0.145 0.122 0.202 0.583 
      
Homeowners 
AY 1999 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.098 -0.080 -0.026 -0.299 -0.055 
Median 0.011 -0.009 0.011 0.017 0.020 
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Table 9.3: Mean and Median of Chain-ladder loss estimation errors of accident-year 
2001  
Commercial Multiple Peril 
AY 2001 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.037 -0.040 0.099 -0.853 -4.169 
Median 0.023 0.012 0.023 0.039 0.040 
      
Commercial Auto Liability 
AY 2001 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.044 -0.002 0.082 0.012 0.046 
Median 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.021 0.059 
      
Other Liability 
AY 2001 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean -0.172 -0.100 0.203 -0.953 0.252 
Median 0.126 0.092 0.122 0.154 0.259 
      
Medical Malpractice 
AY 2001 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.420 0.210 0.532 0.378 0.461 
Median 0.316 0.175 0.291 0.423 0.566 
      
Private Passenger Auto Liability 
AY 2001 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.002 0.029 -0.045 0.068 0.059 
Median 0.053 0.041 0.054 0.064 0.061 
      
Workers’ Compensation 
AY 2001 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.091 0.072 0.120 0.052 -0.119 
Median 0.111 0.118 0.111 0.108 0.066 
      
Product Liability 
AY 2001 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.193 -0.555 -0.034 1.245 0.234 
Median 0.051 -0.031 0.069 0.179 0.133 
      
Homeowners 
AY 2001 All Small Midsize Large Giant 
Mean 0.012 0.004 0.019 0.005 0.030 
Median 0.028 0.017 0.033 0.037 0.060 
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Table 10: Mean and Median of the diversification Benefit on Incurred Losses under 
our definition and BCAR definition  
Diversification Benefit BCAR definition Number of line 
Mean Median Mean Median 
2 0.077 0.013 0.026 0.000 
3 0.191 0.172 0.069 0.018 
4 0.267 0.265 0.089 0.081 
5 0.309 0.277 0.124 0.157 
6 0.343 0.320 0.173 0.202 
7 0.318 0.283 0.202 0.222 
8 0.288 0.230 0.216 0.220 
 
Table 10.1: Mean and Median of the diversification Benefit on Incurred Losses under 
our definition and BCAR definition of midsize insurers  
Average of Diversification 
Benefit 
Median of Diversification 
Benefit Number of line 
Our Definition BCAR Our Definition BCAR 
2 0.066 0.013 0.000 0.000 
3 0.207 0.034 0.184 0.000 
4 0.318 0.041 0.318 0.000 
5 0.325 0.069 0.288 0.000 
6 0.313 0.069 0.288 0.000 
7 0.231 0.000 0.231 0.000 
Overall 0.078 0.022 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 10.2: Mean and Median of the diversification Benefit on Incurred Losses under 
our definition and BCAR definition of large insurers  
Average of Diversification 
Benefit 
Median of Diversification 
Benefit Number of line 
Our Definition BCAR Our Definition BCAR 
2 0.068 0.050 0.017 0.010 
3 0.175 0.104 0.152 0.119 
4 0.237 0.121 0.197 0.151 
5 0.302 0.224 0.277 0.171 
6 0.354 0.180 0.337 0.202 
7 0.300 0.204 0.283 0.222 
8 0.288 0.216 0.230 0.220 
Overall 0.200 0.118 0.173 0.140 
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Table 10.3: Mean and Median of the diversification Benefit on Incurred Losses under 
our definition and BCAR definition of giant insurers  
Average of Diversification 
Benefit 
Median of Diversification 
Benefit Number of line 
Our Definition BCAR Our Definition BCAR 
2 0.070 0.077 0.011 0.033 
3 0.170 0.070 0.136 0.048 
4 0.155 0.117 0.072 0.112 
5 0.217 0.130 0.168 0.149 
6 0.275 0.201 0.267 0.202 
7 0.230 0.210 0.236 0.223 
8 0.299 0.216 0.240 0.217 
Overall 0.214 0.161 0.195 0.199 
 
Table 11: Mean and Median of the diversification Benefit on the loss reserve 
adequacy  
Number of line Average Median 
2 0.129 0.100 
3 0.197 0.166 
4 0.260 0.212 
5 0.225 0.190 
6 0.243 0.220 
7 0.300 0.268 
8 0.336 0.343 
 
Table 12: Mean and Median of the diversification Benefit on the loss reserve 
adequacy by size of insurers  
Midsize Large Giant Number of line 
Average Median Average Median Average Median 
2 0.143 0.113 0.103 0.060 0.129 0.033 
3 0.228 0.195 0.170 0.140 0.153 0.103 
4 0.303 0.251 0.236 0.195 0.103 0.064 
5 0.241 0.239 0.217 0.184 0.225 0.176 
6 0.243 0.215 0.242 0.229 0.246 0.220 
7 0.545 0.545 0.297 0.268 0.307 0.275 
8   0.336 0.343 0.332 0.334 
Overall 0.092 0.000 0.178 0.138 0.236 0.211 
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Figure 1.1a: Industry Aggregate -- plots of accident-year loss ratio and accident-year 
loss development in workers’ compensation  
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Figure 1.1b: Industry Aggregate -- plots of change in accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development in workers’ compensation 
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Figure 1.2a: Industry Aggregate -- plots of accident-year loss ratio and accident-year 
loss development in other liability  
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Figure 1.2b: Industry Aggregate -- plots of change in accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development in other liability   
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Figure 1.3a: Industry Aggregate -- plots of accident-year loss ratio and accident-year 
loss development in private passenger auto liability  
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Figure 1.3b: Industry Aggregate -- plots of change in accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development in private passenger auto liability  
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Figure 1.4a: Industry Aggregate -- plots of accident-year loss ratio and accident-year 
loss development in commercial auto liability  
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Figure 1.4b: Industry Aggregate -- plots of change in accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development in commercial auto liability  
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Figure 1.5a: Industry Aggregate -- plots of accident-year loss ratio and accident-year 
loss development in commercial multiple peril  
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Figure 1.5b: Industry Aggregate -- plots of change in accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development in commercial multiple peril  
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Figure 1.6a: Industry Aggregate -- plots of accident-year loss ratio and accident-year 
loss development in medical malpractice   
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Figure 1.6b: Industry Aggregate -- plots of change in accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development in medical malpractice  
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Figure 1.7a: Industry Aggregate -- plots of accident-year loss ratio and accident-year 
loss development in product liability  
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Figure 1.7b: Industry Aggregate -- plots of change in accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development in product liability  
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Figure 1.8a: Industry Aggregate -- plots of accident-year loss ratio and accident-year 
loss development in homeowners  
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Figure 1.8b: Industry Aggregate -- plots of change in accident-year loss ratio and one-
calendar year loss development in homeowners  
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Figure 2.1: Industry Aggregate -- comparison between actuarial reserve estimates and 
actual incurred losses for accident year 1996  
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Figure 2.2: Industry Aggregate -- comparison between actuarial reserve estimates and 
actual incurred losses for accident year 1999  
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Figure 3: Diversification Benefit on the insured losses (sorted by number of lines) 
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Figure 4: Diversification Benefit on the insured losses under BCAR definition (sorted 
by number of lines) 
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Figure 5: Diversification Benefit on the losses development (sorted by number of 
lines) 
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